

**INJUSTICE (*ZULM*) AS THE CAUSE
OF REVOLUTION IN THE DISCOURSE
OF THE EGYPTIAN ARAB SPRING:
A COGNITIVE SEMANTICS ANALYSIS**

1. INTRODUCTION

From early 2011 protests in Cairo's main square, which ended the three decades of Ḥusnī Mubārak's rule, through a brief military junta rule and Egypt's first democratic presidential elections, to the ousting of the newly elected Islamist president and the reinstatement of an authoritarian regime through military coup in 2013, Egypt had gone through a turbulent period, which the majority of its citizens of different ideological persuasions agree in calling a *revolution*. In the public domain, the revolution, its 'goals' (*ahdāf*), aspirations inspired by it, its slogans, *martyrs* (*šuhadā'*) and *enemies* (*fulūl*) have rapidly occupied the center of public discussion forming a characteristic strand of political discourse. This new revolutionary discourse was centered around a coherent set of concepts, some of which, such as FULŪL (debris of the Ancien Régime)¹, were new coinages reflecting the dominant mood of the day or updated versions of the ones known from long before², others, such as and QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION)³, assumed new sociopragmatic functions. This article is dedicated to the analysis of a concept representing yet another class of what could be described as *cultural constants*, a concept, which had long dominated

¹ For the analysis of FULŪL see Alexander Bogomolov. Constructing Political Other in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring. Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia. V. XIV, 2014, pp. 7–31.

² Elsewhere we have demonstrated how the changed practice of political protest and its communication environment in the course of January 25 events affected the meaning of the concept of REVOLUTION – cf. Alexander Bogomolov. The 18 Days that Changed Egypt: the Concept of *Revolution* in the Egyptian Arab Spring Discourse. Skhodnavstvo. Issue 70, 2015, pp. 11–34.

³ Alexander Bogomolov. An Eye for an Eye and the Struggle for Power in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring. Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia. Vol. XIV, p. 13–33.

the Egyptian and Arab political discourses, whose role in the discourse of January 25 revolutions appears to be quite unique.

When faced with the need to explain the reasons behind the January 25 revolution Egyptian authors would mostly cite *ZULM* (wronging, injustice, oppression⁴) as the main characteristic of the Ancien Régime, while varying on other details, which may reflect their diverging political persuasions and writing styles. Here are a few examples:

(1) *ša 'b t̄āra 'alā az-ẓulm wa al-fasād wa al-ifqār*⁵ (people rose up against *ZULM*, corruption and impoverishment);

(2) *ša 'b t̄āra 'alā az-ẓlm wa al-fasād wa dīktātūriyyat ḥukm al-fard*⁶ (people rose up against *ZULM*, corruption and dictatorship of the rule of individual);

(3) *ša 'b t̄āra 'alā az-ẓulm wa al-fasād wa al-istibdād*⁷ (people rose up against *ZULM*, corruption and despotism);

(4) *ša 'b t̄āra 'alā az-ẓulm wa aṭ-ṭuḡyān* (people rose up against *ZULM* and tyranny).

The fact that it is *ZULM* that is seen as the single most important cause or motive of the Egyptian revolution is evident from its syntactic position as the head term in a coordinated row. It may be argued also that other members in these groups of two or three are semantically

⁴ For the sake of simplicity in this paper we use the phonetic symbol *z* as representation of the Arabic *ẓ*, which reflects the Egyptian and also urban Levantine manner of pronouncing this sound as opposed to the Classical Arabic one, which would be best represented as *ḏ*; for the convenience of non-Arab speakers, through out this text in brackets or otherwise we enter only those English equivalents of Arabic words that are deemed to be appropriate to specific context or the more salient ones; otherwise, even the relatively concise Arabic English dictionaries cite very long lists of equivalents for the derivatives of *ẓlm* e.g. for the noun *ẓlm* – *wrong, iniquity, injustice, inequity, unfairness, oppressions, repression, suppression, tyranny*; and for the verb *ẓalam* also to *ill-treat* and *harm* (cf. Wehr, H. 1976. A dictionary of modern written Arabic. Edited by J. Milton Cowan. 3rd ed. Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, Inc.); such a broad range of English equivalents also highlights *ZULM* as an idiosyncratic concept.

⁵ From an article on oppositional website Mada Masr of 15 Feb, 2015. – <http://goo.gl/YTaVp0>

⁶ <http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/344315.aspx>

⁷ <http://goo.gl/FrHhEe>

dependent on ZULM – they have overlapping semantic elements with it and have been augmented in order to rhetorically amplify or elaborate on its meaning⁸.

Before we go into further detail, it merits saying a few words on our understanding of *concepts* as units of language semantics, their role in shaping discourses and the methodological sources of the present study. In our view, concepts represent complex semantic structures, which may be materially represented in text as one or more nominations including cognates belonging to different world classes (nouns, verbs, active or passive participles) or groups of synonyms. These lexical units combine with other lexis forming stable collocations, some of which could be idioms. It is these collocations that we go after, when compiling our mini-corpus of discourse samples on the basis of media texts available on the web, which constitutes the raw data of our study.

The core structure of a concept may be described as a Fillmorean frame⁹, while stable collocations composed of key nominations representing the concept (e.g. n. *zulm*, v. *zalam*) with various modifiers expressing ideas that may be associated with the concept. The latter may often include culture-specific beliefs, which may be formulated by analyst in the form of propositions¹⁰, e.g. ‘retaliation (QIŞĀŞ) is best performed in a *speedy* manner’¹¹. Some stable collocations may also indicate that a conceptual metaphor may be involved¹². Particularly

⁸ The less connected one being *fasād* (decay, corruption, depravity).

⁹ Cf. Fillmore, C.J. 1985. “Frames and the semantics of understanding”. *Quaderni di Semantica* VI. 2. pp. 222–254 and FrameNet, a web-based corpus, which draws on Fillmore’s frame semantics. – <https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/home>

¹⁰ Cf. the notion of *cultural propositions* in Donal Carbaugh, *Cultural Discourse Analysis: Pragmatics of Social Interaction* in Alessandro Capone, Jacob L. Mey (eds.), *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*, Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London 2016, p. 576–577.

¹¹ Cf. Alexander Bogomolov, *An Eye for an Eye and the Struggle for Power in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring*. *Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia*. Vol. XV, p. 13–33.

¹² Cf. Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 2003. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

indicative in that sense are collocations of nominal representations of the concept with prepositions and verbs. For instance, collocations of the noun *zulm* (injustice, oppression, wrong) with the derivatives of the verb *waqa'* (to fall) and spatial prepositions, e.g. *taht* (under), point to a metaphoric representation of ZULM as an *object falling from sky*, i.e. an area beyond human control, which conveys a perception of *injustice* as an unpredictable and fatal force.

The 'cultural' meanings, when explicated by an analyst in the form of propositions, would often sound as phrases that are never actually said, as for members of a speech community they would represent statements of the obvious. Alternatively, they may become idioms, which although structured as propositions (*oppression has an end*¹³) unlike non-idiomatic, 'normal' propositions, which convey new information, only feature in the argumentative part of an utterance or text. What also helps us identify these meanings as culturally predetermined notions is that they do not in fact appear so obvious for the members of another speech community, such as the one of the analyst. For instance, the idea of *speediness* as a necessary prerequisite of good *retaliation* or *justice* in general may be contrasted with the European notion of *revenge* as 'a dish best served cold' and the notion of 'fair trial', which puts premium on ensuring the quality of evidence and the equality of the parties, which may only come at the expense of the expediency. Also, artificially constructed cultural propositions, expressing pieces of local knowledge, belong to a meta-level, at which ordinary speakers normally do not operate. Yet, it is these elements of the concepts that lend them their distinct outlook and capacity to shape discourses even without being explicitly represented in text.

2. Key nominations: lexis, grammar, frame semantics and basic pragmatics

In discourse, the concept that we discuss in this paper is most often explicitly represented by derivatives of the root \sqrt{zlm} , including the transitive verb *zalam* (to wrong, treat unjustly, tyrannize, commit outrage), active participle functioning mostly as adjective or noun

¹³ This is an English translation of an Arabic idiom, which we discuss in more detail below.

zālim (unjust, unfair; tyrant, oppressor), passive participle *maẓlūm*¹⁴ (*wronged, ill-treated, oppresses, tyrannized*), and the form *ẓulm* featuring as both a verbal noun (*maṣḍar*) or a simple noun¹⁵, which for the sake of convenience we will use as the material representant of the concept for the purposes of this study. Aside from the derivatives of $\sqrt{z}lm$, there is at least one more root $\sqrt{j}wr$, whose two derivatives – the verb *jār* and active participle *jā'ir* – convey a closely related set of meanings, but occur in a narrower set of contexts. There is also a group of lexis appearing in dictionaries in mutually defining pairs with the derivatives of $\sqrt{z}lm$ and occasionally functioning as synonyms to them, which includes *ṭāġiya* (tyrant, defined as a ruler, whose essential characteristic is being *zālim*¹⁶), *baġā/baġy* (generally meaning *seek, desire*, but with the preposition 'alā – upon, against – acquiring a different meaning – *oppress, commit outrage*), and *ġašam/ġašm* (*treat unjustly or tyrannically, to wrong, oppress, but also to act thoughtlessly, haphazardly, with the latter in all probability being the original meaning of the verb*)¹⁷. Aside from being explicitly represented in discourse by this large variety of forms and lexis, the concept may also appear in an implicit form, manifesting its presence through a set of cognitively linked or associated meanings.

The fact that the full set of grammatical derivatives of $\sqrt{z}lm$ is in actual use and demonstrates high frequency of occurrence means that texts foregrounding all core elements (semantic roles) of its Fillmorean frame-semantic structure are represented in the actual speech practice¹⁸.

¹⁴ Active and passive participles may fill into the slots of Agent and Patient in a Fillmorean frame-semantic representation of ZULM or function as adjectives or nouns in structures indirectly invoking ZULM without referring to specific situations that may be described as such.

¹⁵ The classical Arabic dictionaries insist that *ẓulm* is a noun used in lieu of *maṣḍar* (*ism yaqūm maqām al-maṣḍar*) – cf. Ibn Manzūr. Lisān al-'arab. Beirut: Dār Šādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.

¹⁶ See, for instance, the online Arabic dictionary at <http://www.almaany.com/>, where *ṭāġiya* is defined as *šadīd az-ẓulm* (strong in respect of ZULM).

¹⁷ For the sake of economy here we use the list of English equivalents from Wehr, H. 1976. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. Edited by J. Milton Cowan. 3rd ed. Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, Inc.

¹⁸ It is interesting that the forms of active and passive participles, which indicate the foregrounding of either Agent or Patient in text, demonstrate al-

From the point of view of sociopragmatics, this may be interpreted as an evidence of a multi-dimensional perspective on the situations described by the frame ZULM and the significance attached by the speech community to providing the perspectives of different social actors involved in situations thus defined.

Despite the fact that the verb *zalam* (oppress, wrong smb.) conveys an idea of an interaction between sentient/animate Agent and Patient, the verb is quite unspecific as regards the actual nature of this interaction, and a stand-alone phrase **zalamta Aḥmadu Zaydan* modeled on the Arab grammarians' classical phrase *ḍaraba Aḥmadu Zaydan* (Ahmad has beaten Zayd) would hardly make much sense. On the other hand, a far higher frequency of the phrase *anā maẓlūm* (I am wronged, oppressed), as opposed to *huwa maẓlūm* (he is wronged, oppressed) suggests that ZULM more often features as a subject of complaint than of an objective observation¹⁹. While a stand-alone phrase with the verb *zalam* would hardly appear informative, there are, however, multiple contexts, in which *maẓlūm* (or *zālim*) would appear to be not in need of any specification, cf.:

inna da'wat al-maẓlūm laysa baynahā wa bayna allāhi ḥijāb, fa-innahu mahmā kāna ḍalīl^{an} ḍa'īf^{an} aw muhān^{an} waḍī'ān fa-inna allāh^a nāṣarahu 'alā man zalamahu...²⁰

[As for the] the call of the oppressed/wrong one, there is no veil (in the sense of *barrier* or *obstacle* that may block vision or hearing. – A. B.) between it and Allah, and however abject and weak or humiliated and lowly [he may be], Allah shall help him against [he] who wronged him...

In such a context *maẓlūm* appears to refer to a *lasting* state that the Patient of an act of ZULM, is experiencing. The verb *zalam*, hence, appears to describe an act that causes a protracted negative affect upon a sentient (usually human) Patient, but the verb as such does not unambiguously explicate the nature of this act or its specific details. By the same token, the substantivated active participle *zālim* will mostly refer

most the same level of occurrence – 9,420,000 results for *zālim* and 9,840,000 results for *maẓlūm* on Google search (data of 21 April, 2016).

¹⁹ 38,900 results on Google search against 649 results as of April 13, 2016.

²⁰ <http://www.masrawy.com/ketabat/ArticlesDetails.aspx?AID=152022>

to an entity, whose essential or permanent quality is the aptitude to commit acts of ZULM, or be engaged in such acts on a regular basis²¹.

While evaluation is a key element of ZULM semantics, the evaluation mode changes depending on whether Agent or Patient is foregrounded. When the concept is represented by the passive participle *mazlūm*, foregrounding Patient, the evaluation is given from an individual subjective perspective and tends to assume a psychological tilt. With *zālim* Agent will be foregrounded and the evaluation will be axiological, while the noun *zulm* associated with an external observer's (objective) perspective would reflect a normative mode of evaluation. The variety of evaluation modes²² associated with ZULM is a unique characteristic of the concept, which enhances its functionality as an element of political discourse.

In ZULM semantics, the (negative) evaluation is clearly the most essential but not the only element, as the derivatives of \sqrt{zlm} and \sqrt{jwr} are certainly far more specific than such terms as *good* and *bad*. Aside from the evaluative part, the rest of ZULM semantics is comprised of its Agent – Patient frame structure, which gives direction to the application of negative evaluation²³. It also includes a set of associated ideas, which we will analyze in more detail below. Disparate as they may appear these ideas demonstrate enough coherence to be viewed as part of a single concept. Generally, the concept functions as a categorizer in respect of a specific (if even a bit fuzzy) set of social transactions and the effects of such transactions on the status of their participants, and constitutes an essential and rather salient element in what may be described as the ethical conceptual toolkit of the Arab political discourse.

3. ZULM within a broader domain of JUSTICE

Within a universe of meanings representing the domain of JUSTICE in Arabic, the concept of ZULM appears to function as its nega-

²¹ As we shall see below, *zālim* may also be used as an adjective with nouns signifying action.

²² On various types of evaluation cf. N. D. Arutiunova. *Tipy iazykovykh znachenii. Otsenka. Sobytie. Fakt.* Moscow: Nauka, 1988, pp. 64–71.

²³ Agent is always *bad*, it is a marked part of the pair, while Patient is neutral; by means of empathic deixis Patient may be indicated as an object of speaker's empathy and Agent as emotionally removed.

tive pole. One of its key idiosyncratic features, which catches the eye at once, is the absence of any formal negation in its key material representants – derivatives of the roots \sqrt{zlm} and \sqrt{jwr} – which may be contrasted to similar lexis in the European languages, where the opposite of JUSTICE is usually expressed as JUSTICE + *negation* (expressed by negative particle or prefix). In Arabic, while the positive pole in the domain of JUSTICE is represented by the derivatives of the root $\sqrt{d\bar{l}}$ – e.g. *‘adl*, *‘adāla* (justice), *‘ādil* (just), derivatives of \sqrt{zlm} by far outscore those of $\sqrt{d\bar{l}}$ with negation in the actual usage: *ḡayr ‘ādil* (not just) returned about 348,000 results²⁴ vs. *zālim* – about 9,460,000 results; *‘adam ‘adl* – about 15,900 results and *‘adam al-‘adl* about 44,200 results²⁵ vs. *zulm* – about 9,220,000 results. It is, hence, more likely that the idea of being unjust/unfair would be expressed with adjective *zālim* rather than *ḡayr ‘ādil*, cf.:

a) ...wa lan uhanñ ra’īs al-wuzarā’ al-jadīd bi-taškīl al-ḡukūma li-an-nahu taškīl *zālim* li-l-aqbāt²⁶

...and I will not congratulate the new Prime Minister on the composition of the government for [it is] a composition *unjust/unfair* to the Copts.

By contrast, the form with negation *ḡayr ‘ādil* is more likely to appear in two distinct contexts. Either when the Arabic text is based on a translation from a European language source²⁷, cf.:

b) akkadat milissā Fleming al-mutaḡaddīta b-ism al-mufawwadiyya al-‘ulyā li-ṣu’ūn al-lāji’īn bi-l-umam al-muttaḡadda – al-yawm as-sabt – anna an-nizām al-ūrūbbī *ḡayr ‘ādil* ma’a al-lāji’īn²⁸

Melissa Fleming, an official spokesperson for the UNHCR, stated today, on Saturday that the European system is *unjust* toward the refugees.

²⁴ While in all other cases we only use Google data attributed to Egyptian sources, in this paragraph the data is cited irrespective of the ‘region’ parameter on the advanced Google search.

²⁵ Large part of this massive represent a very narrow range of contexts, for instance, the phrase *‘adam al-‘adl bayn* (lack of justice/injustice between) has returned 20,700 results, of which *‘adam al-‘adl bayn az-zawjāt* (injustice between the spouses) accounts for about 9,380 results.

²⁶ <http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/37728/>

²⁷ In the case below the source language had been most probably English.

²⁸ <http://goo.gl/nxKFwp>

Or when it is applied in a dialog (also when such dialog is narrated in an indirect form) and the use of *zālim* is apparently restricted by the rules of politeness, cf.:

c) *šahīdat al-jalsa aš-šabāhiyya (...)* wāqī'a mu'sifa (...)
bi-taṭāwul an-nā'ib fathī aš-šarqāwī 'alā ra'īs al-majlis ad-duktūr 'alī 'abd al-'āl muttahiman iyyāhu bi-annahu *ğayr 'ādil* fi i'tā' al-kalima li-nuwwāb...²⁹

The morning session witnessed (...) a sad incident (...) with the Deputy Fathi al-Sharqawi attacking the chairman of the Parliament Dr. Ali Abd-al-Al, accusing him that he [is] *unjust* (*lit.* not just) in his [manner of] giving the floor to deputies...

Derivatives of $\sqrt{z\bar{l}m}$, and not of $\sqrt{d\bar{l}}$ + negation, function as preferred antonyms to the derivatives of $\sqrt{d\bar{l}}$. This situation, in our opinion, cannot be attributed to a morphological structural factor, *viz.* that, unlike the European languages, Arabic does not possess negative prefixes and forms like *ğayr^m 'ādil^m* are, strictly speaking, noun phrases and not single words like English *unjust* and *unfair*, which might have rendered them less convenient for use. As we have demonstrated, such negative noun phrases do occur quite frequently, and there seems to be no purely morphological constraint for their broader use. The difference, hence, has more to do with semantic preferences rather than morphology. At the face of it, the opposition *'ādil – ğayr 'ādil* appears to be a privative one, while *'ādil – zālim* – an equipollent one, meaning that in terms of volume of information there is one bit difference between the two terms in the former case and an unspecified (or unspecifiable) difference in the latter one. The situation of course is not as simple as that, when it comes to semantics as opposed to phonology, in relation to which the notions of privative and equipollent oppositions were suggested and where they best apply³⁰, but still there seems to be a grain of truth in mentioning these concepts here, if even metaphorically. The distance between the pair of opposite terms not involving negation appears to be greater, and concepts that don't include explicit negations, such as *ZULM* appear to be semantically richer than those modeled on $\sim X$. *ZULM* is also more

²⁹ <http://aakhbar.com/news/1144985->

³⁰ Cf. Trubetzkoy, N. S. 1939. Principles of phonology. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Chapter 1.

precise heuristically, for, in contrast to JUSTICE + *negation* constructs, its referential scope is more clearly defined with Agent and Patient slots corresponding to specific social actors and a more clearly specified evaluative component³¹.

Finally, there seems to be a cultural preference in Arabic prizing such concepts as ZULM over their more abstract equivalents. Another case in point is QIŞĀŞ (retaliation), which often replaces or overwrites a more generic ‘ADĀLA (justice)³². In both cases a more specific term stands for a more generic one, – a situation reminiscent of synecdoche³³. It doesn’t seem to be the case, however, that the preference is given to one set of terms as opposed to another merely for the sake of being more specific. The true underlying motive seems to be that when talking about socially important events or acts, Arabic speakers appreciate *difference* over *indifference*, an *engaged* rather than a *restrained* perspective. The *difference* and *specificity* appear to be intimately related dimensions of meaning³⁴, for a closer position of the observer seems to be coherent with more specificity. The *difference*, however, appears to take precedence over *specificity*, as there

³¹ It is not accidental, perhaps, that there is no frame of (in)Justice on the Framenet, while it offers a description of such as related notion and cognate term as Justify – cf. <https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/index.php?q=frameIndex>

³² For details and illustrations cf. ours An Eye for an Eye and the Struggle for Power in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring. Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia, 2015, Vol. XV, pp. 13–33; interestingly, in one example of an Arabic translation from English (p. 18 *ibid.*); the selling point of QIŞĀŞ as opposed to the abstract notion of ‘*adāla* (justice) is its prescriptive/normative component – it not only ascribes a clear set of semantic roles which helps make better sense of a wide range of real life situations, but prescribes a culturally prized solution based on a popular belief – namely that *justice is essentially about punishment*.

³³ Of course, synecdoche whereby an individual stands for a class, part for a whole, or material for a thing, is hardly applicable to the semantic domain of JUSTICE, representing basically a set of abstract notions.

³⁴ Cf. the notion of *semantic dimensions* or *dimensions of meaning* in Donal Carbaugh, Cultural Discourse Analysis: Pragmatics of Social Interaction in Alessandro Capone, Jacob L. Mey (eds.), in Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society, Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London 2016, p. 576.

are cases when the former appears to be important while the latter seems to be irrelevant³⁵.

4. Some historic reconstructions

In this section the analysis of some historic and current collocations with the derivatives of $\sqrt{z\bar{l}m}$, including notably the idioms, will help us reconstruct the sociopragmatic³⁶ evolution of the concept. A dramatic shift that we believe had occurred in a relatively recent time in the meaning and functioning of the concept, when it became closely associated with the domain of POWER, is somewhat concealed by the simultaneous availability to a modern speaker of the diachronically older and more recent semantic structures, of which the more archaic ones have been sustained by the Islamic normative and devotional discourses rife with quotations from the medieval language of the prophetic traditions.

4.1 ZULM at its source: Sunna and the classical lexicography

The use of the derivatives of $\sqrt{z\bar{l}m}$ as terms belonging to the domain of social relations in much the same sense as today dates to as early as the mid-8th century AD – the time when the 1st Arabic dictionary was compiled by al-Ḥalīl ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī, cf.:

wa az-zulmu aḥḍuka ḥaqqa ġayrika. wa az-zulāmatu: maẓlamatuka taṭlubuhā ‘inda az-zālim. wa ẓallamtuhu taẓlīman iḍā anba’tuhu annahu zālim. wa ẓulima fulānun fa-zzalama, ayy iḥtamala az-zulma bi-tībi nafsihi (...) wa iḍā su’ila saḥīyyun mā lā yajidu yuqāl: huwa maẓlūm

³⁵ For instance the terms *nizā’* (conflict) and *ṣirā’* (conflict, struggle) are used in reference to identical situations described at the same level of detail/abstraction, meanwhile the former mostly occurs in texts translated from European languages, reflecting a disengaged observer’s perspective, and the latter can never be used with enemy as Agent – cf. Alexander Bogomolov. Firm in the Face of the Enemy: Semantic Analysis of the Concept of *Ṣumūd* in Modern Arabic. *Folia Orientalia*, Vol. 38, 2002, p. 46.

³⁶ For the distinction between sociopragmatics as “culture-specific” study of “external pragmatic factors affecting language use” and more traditional pragmatology cf. Linda R. Waugh et al. *Critical Discourse Analysis: Definition, Approaches, Relation to Pragmatics, Critique, and Trends in Alessandro Capone, Jacob L. Mey (eds.), Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*, Springer Cham Heidelberg. NY, Dordrecht London 2016, pp. 91–92.

and *ZULM* [is] your taking of someone else's right, and *Zulāma*: your object of *ZULM* (i.e. something you have been unlawfully deprived of. – A. B.), [which] you ask of *Zālim* (Agent of *ZULM*). And *zallamtuhu tazlīm*³⁷ [means] if I have let him know that he is *Zālim* (Agent of *ZULM*), and *zulima*³⁸ someone and *izzalama*³⁹ means sustained *ZULM* of his free will (...) and if a generous [person] was asked smth. [which] he [could] not find it is said: he [is] *mazlūm*⁴⁰ (Patient of *ZULM*).

What is markedly different in this old usage from the modern one is the easiness, with which the Patient and Agent of *ZULM* relate to each other: the gloss seems to describe a peer to peer relationship rather than that between a powerless individual and someone in the position of power. The other difference is that *ZULM* may be inflicted upon oneself voluntarily or represent an act of generosity. From this perspective, *ZULM* appears to mean little more than deprivation of some sort of boon owned by an individual without inflicting moral damage as is the case with the current usage. The use of the verb *aḥaq* (take) in describing the nature of the transaction between the Patient and Agent of *ZULM* points to an understanding of *other person's right* (*ḥaqq ḡayruka*) as *property*, as something that *belongs* to someone else. Yet another evidence to *Property* as a Theme in *ZULM*⁴¹ is the use of the verb *salab* (to rob, steal) in al-Lisān in the interpretation of the Quranic ayah *inna allāh^u lā yazlumu mitqālⁿ dirratⁿ* (Quran 4: 40) (surely Allah does not do injustice [even to the amount of] a speck of dust)⁴².

The idea that *ḥaqq* at its source could simply mean *property* is indirectly corroborated by evidence from the Arabic vernaculars: in some Arabian dialects, such as Yemeni, *ḥaqq* developed into a pos-

³⁷ v. 2nd form 1st pers. sing. derivative of \sqrt{zlm} and the verbal noun (*maṣdar*) or the same verb.

³⁸ v. passive 1st form 3rd p. sing. derivative of \sqrt{zlm} .

³⁹ v. 8th form 3rd p. sing. of \sqrt{zlm} .

⁴⁰ passive part. of \sqrt{zlm} .

⁴¹ The term Theme is used in the same sense as in the Ch. J. Fillmore's Framenet project, as in the following definition of the frame Taking: an Agent removes a Theme from a Source so that it is in the Agent's possession. cf. <https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/index.php?q=frameIndex>

⁴² Cf. Lisān al-‘Arab entry for \sqrt{zlm} in Ibn Manẓūr. Lisān al-‘Arab. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.

sessive particle, the so called *nota genetivi*. A more familiar term for property *māl* appears in Lisān in the entry for \sqrt{zlm} , cf. the following glosses for the 5th verbal form *taẓallam*: *taẓallamanī fulān ayy ẓalamanī māli* (someone V me meaning V me my property) and *aġāra ‘alā an-nās ḥattā yakṭura māluhu* (raided people in order for his property to increase)⁴³. Al-Lisān also offers another interesting gloss for *ẓalama* – *mana ‘a ‘an ḥaqqih* (prevent from his ḥaqq)⁴⁴, which may be construed as a metonymic shift from *ḥaqq* as (an item) of property to the ability to operate with such item.

Other al-Ḥalīl’s glosses suggest the use of the verb *ẓalam* in reference to what could be described as a *breech in a logical cause-and-effect relationship* or the *usual course of events*, cf.: *wa ẓulimat an-nāqa: nuḥirat min ġayr dā’ wa lā kibar* (and the she-camel *ẓulimat* (passive form of *ẓalam*): was slain without sickness or old age), and *wa ẓulimat al-ard: lam tuḥfar qaṭṭu tumma ḥufirat* (and the land *ẓulimat* (passive form of *ẓalam*): had never been dug and then was dug). This meaning appears to be the link between the more familiar usage from the domain of social relations and what we reconstruct as the original meaning of \sqrt{zlm} , which we will illustrate by another medieval text, arguably an older one compared to al-Ḥalīl’s⁴⁵, cf.:

ruwia ‘an umm salama annahā qālat li-‘uṭmān bni ‘affān, raḍiyā allāhu ‘anhu: tawaḥḥi ḥayṭ tawaḥḥā ṣāhibāka fa-innahumā *ṭakamā laka al-ḥaqq ṭakman* ayy bayyanāhu wa awḍaḥāhu ḥattā tabayyana ka-annahu maḥajja zāhira (...) arādat umm salama anna-humā lazimā al-ḥaqq wa lam *yazlimā* wa lā *ḥarajā* ‘an al-maḥajja *yamīnan wa lā šimālan* wa minhu al-ḥadīṭ al-āḥar: anna abā bakr wa ‘umar *ṭakamā* al-amra fa-lam *yazlimāh*

It was transmitted from [the words of] Umm Salama that she told Uthman Ibn Affan, may Allah be pleased with him: turn your steps to where your [two] companions have turned their steps for they have

⁴³ Cf. Lisān al-‘Arab entry for \sqrt{zlm} in Ibn Manẓūr. Lisān al-‘Arab. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ The text appears in 13th cent. dictionary Lisān al-‘Arab under the entry *ṭ-k-m* as an illustration but contains reference to a hadith dating to the early days of the rule of the 3rd caliph ‘Uṭmān ibn ‘Affān (reign in 644–656 A.D.), cf. Ibn Manẓūr. Lisān al-‘Arab. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.

*trodden out for you the truth very well*⁴⁶, meaning they have elucidated it and made it clear until it transpired as if it was a visible main road (...) Umm Salama meant that the two of them held on to a right (direction) and did not *deviate*, neither did they *go out* from the main road *to the right, nor to the left*, and from this [originates] another [prophetic] tradition: Abu Bakr and Umar held on (*lit.* stayed on) to the cause and did not deviate from it.

The communicative objective of the cited text is to explain a metaphor. The metaphor is materially represented in the text in the form of a collocation *takamā laka al-ḥaqq takman* (they have trodden out for you the truth very well), which brings together terms from two remote semantic domains (*takamā* & *ḥaqq*). The former term refers to a situation of traveling along a path⁴⁷ (source domain of the metaphor), and the latter one represents an abstract notion (target domain⁴⁸). The *cognitive* surplus that the metaphor aims to add to the recipient's understanding of the concept of TRUTH/RIGHT is that *seeking truth (or the right way of doing things) is a bit like looking for the right track, when heading somewhere in the desert*. The speaker uses this idea to argue for the message she tries to convey, *viz.* that instead of *wandering* around (a meaning expressed by the verb *zalam*) *one should take guidance*⁴⁹. *The cited text, hence, appears to be significant*

⁴⁶ The meaning *tread* is our reconstruction is inspired by such glosses as *lazimtuḥu* for *takimtu aṭ-ṭarīq^a* (cf. entry for $\sqrt{\text{tkm}}$ in Ibn Manẓūr. Lisān al-'arab. Beirut: Dār Šādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.), but based mainly on our reading of the context – how else could one make clearer (*awdah*) the path if not by persistent walking, which makes the tracks visible; in our translation the modifier *very well* corresponds to the form of so called *masdar muṭlaq* (absolute masdar), a nominal cognate of the verb used in the syntactic position of a direct object with an emphatic function.

⁴⁷ One should not be confused by the idea of modern roads, as before getting anywhere in the desert one had to actually find the right track by reading trails and various signposts left by the predecessors.

⁴⁸ It would be a challenging task to try and define precisely what the target domain could have been for the speaker back in the early Middle Ages, but for the purposes of this study a loose definition such as the *domain of abstract ideas* appears to be sufficient.

⁴⁹ In this case of the 3rd Caliph Uṭmān – from his predecessors – the two previous Righteously guided Caliphs (*ḥulafā' rāšidūn*) – Abu Bakr and 'Umar.

not only for its historic value as a sample of discussions that may have occurred at an important juncture in early Islamic history, but also as a sample of a conceptual cognitive process that helped shape one of the deep underlying principles of the Islamic beliefs system, reflected in the Quranic notions of religion as a straight path (as-sirāt al-mustaqīm) and a guided journey (hudā).

The strategy used to unpack the metaphor in the cited early medieval text is essentially the same as the one we use nowadays: it is based on making the source domain more explicit (more recognizable) for the recipient by adding specific details, which also prompt additional metaphoric entailments⁵⁰. The verb *zalam* here is used to highlight one such additional detail of the source domain and features in a purely spatial/orientational sense conveying the meaning ‘to deviate’ or ‘go right and left’ from a ‘straight path’. Through the metaphoric projection the notion of TRUTH is represented as *maḥajja*, which in classical dictionaries is described as *wasat at-ṭarīq, jādda* (central part of a road)⁵¹. TRUTH hence is metaphorically represented as a well-trodden track, the one that goes in the middle among a plethora of less clearly marked trails⁵² and derivatives of \sqrt{zlm} represent the opposite of it.

While texts eliciting the original spatial/orientational semantics of \sqrt{zlm} are rare, the same meaning ‘deviate’ is far easier to illustrate for the synonymous root \sqrt{jwr} and it appears to be well documented in both classical and modern dictionaries, cf.:

⁵⁰ For the notion of *entailment* in the conceptual metaphor theory cf. Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 1981. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 9, 12, 44, 91, 93, 94, 97, 102 etc.

⁵¹ See *maḥajja* and *jādda* under entries for \sqrt{hjj} and \sqrt{jdd} resp. in Ibn Manzūr. *Lisān al-ʿArab*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.; *jādda* appears to have been a more basic notion for the classical lexicographers as *maḥajja* is explained through *jādda*, while the latter is described as *muʿzam at-ṭarīq* (major part of the road), *wasatuhu* (i.e. *at-ṭarīq* – central part of the road), and *at-ṭarīq al-aʿzam alladī yajmaʿ at-ṭuruq* (the greatest road, which connects/combines all roads).

⁵² Consider also the following gloss on *maḥajja* from the same entry \sqrt{hjj} : *wa yuqāl li-l-ard al-mustawiyya laysa fihā raml wa lā ihṭilāf* (and [it is] said of a flat land, in which there is no sand, nor difference/divergence) – obviously, one cannot be sure when one steps on sand – only a flat and solid ground can preserve a track visible for a traveler – *ibid*.

jawr: (...) dīdd al-qaṣd (...) tark al-qaṣd fī sayr (...) jāra ‘an aṭ-ṭarīq: ‘adala wa al-jawr: al-mayl ‘an al-qaṣd wa jāra ‘alayhi fī al-ḥukm...⁵³

JAWR: (...) opposite of purpose (object, intent) (...) abandoning of purpose (destination) in traveling (...) stray from the path: deviate and JAWR: the deviation from the purpose/destination and deviated against him in judgment⁵⁴.

Cf. also the modern glosses *jāra aṭ-ṭarīq: lan yuhtada fīh* (strayed [from] the path: has not been guided on it) and *jāra fī ḥukmih: ḡalama* (deviated in judging him – wronged [him])⁵⁵, which point to a synonymous relationship between the derivatives of \sqrt{jwr} and \sqrt{zlm} and counterpose ZULM and HUDĀ.

Property as a Theme in ZULM is still preserved in an idiom (proverb) *man ḥakam fī mālihi mā ḡalam* ([he] who disposed of his property has not wronged), which is usually used to justify someone’s decision regarding his/her property in a situation when such decision may hurt another person’s interests (e.g. father favoring one son over the other in his will). Another proverb *aḡlam min al-ḥayya (af ‘ā)* (*aḡlam*⁵⁶ than the snake), despite a popular interpretation featuring already in the classical Arabic dictionaries, which attributes it to the supposed habit of snakes to appropriate burrows dug by other animals, cf. *wa yuqāl aḡlam min al-ḥayya li-annah ta’ī al-juḥra lam taḥtafirhu fa-taskunuh* (and it is said: *aḡlam* than the snake because it comes to a burrow [that] it has not dug and inhabits it)⁵⁷, – may in fact be a reflection of the source meaning of \sqrt{zlm} as described above, i.e. ‘go right and left, deviate from a straight path’, which is exactly how the snake moves. The proverb, hence, may have originally meant ‘less straightforward than a snake’. Finally, another popular proverb

⁵³ Lisān al-‘Arab, entry *jawr*.

⁵⁴ The phrase may refer to either common misjudgment or miscarriage of law.

⁵⁵ Al-Mu‘jam al-Wasīṭ cited through <http://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/>

⁵⁶ Adj. comp. deg. from \sqrt{zlm} , the modern speaker certainly understands this form as *more tyrannical or more unjust*, but it does not have to be the original meaning of the form in the this context, for which reason we have refrained from entering any specific English equivalent in the translation of the proverb at this stage.

⁵⁷ Cf. Ibn Manzūr. Lisān al-‘Arab. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols., entry for *ḡalam*.

man šābah abāhu mā zalam ([he] who resembles his father has not wronged)⁵⁸ seems to preserve the link to another historic sub-meaning of the root ‘breach in the usual course of events, or cause and effect chain’, which we have discussed above, in this section.

4.2 ZULM and power relations in the mediaeval Arabic

Idea of *complaining* about ZULM in Arabic is expressed by a group of derivatives of the same root, which in modern usage include the 5th form verbal form *taẓallam* (complain/ask for redemption of injustice), and *mazlīma* (subject of complaint, item to be redeemed)⁵⁹. In the classical dictionaries, the Complaint/Redemption request frame expressed by these derivatives may be often described as a situation, when Patient of ZULM (*mazlūm*) directly approaches the Agent of ZULM (*zālim*) asking him to redeem the damage, which implies an equal power status of both parties, cf. the following gloss from Lisān al-‘Arab: *aẓ-zulāmat^u wa aẓ-zalīmat^u wa al-mazlīmat^u: mā taṭlubuh^u ‘inda aẓ-zālim* (the matter of complaint⁶⁰ [is] what you ask/seek from the wrongdoer)⁶¹. On the other hand, as other classical glosses suggest the Complaint/Redemption request frame also may have a slot for a (powerful) Intermediary, which appears to be the only way, by which power relations may be encoded in the concept in the mediaeval Arabic, cf.: *wa yuqālu: taẓallama fulān^{um} ilā al-ḥākimiⁱ min fulān^{im} fa-ẓallamah^u taẓlīm^{an} ayy anṣafah^u min zālimihⁱ wa a‘ānah^u ‘alayh* (and they say: someone complained to the ruler against someone and [the latter] satisfied the complaint⁶² meaning was fair/just to him [by

⁵⁸ The kinship term may be changed according to specific context.

⁵⁹ Although the idea of Complaint may be also expressed by a more generic verb *šakā/yaškū* (to complain), it appears that the native speakers give preference to the cognate verb, for instance the phrase *yaškū zulm* (he complains of injustice) returned 18,000 results on Google search, while the synonymous *yataẓallam* – 164,000 results (data as of 1 August, 2016).

⁶⁰ The gloss contains three synonyms, of which the 1st one is also used in the sense of the *act* of complaining.

⁶¹ Lisān al-‘Arab. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.; vol. Zā’; other examples could also be found in classical dictionaries.

⁶² There seems to be no other interpretation possible here of the 2nd form verb *ẓallam*, which elsewhere in the Lisān is interpreted as *accuse someone of being zālim* (the agent of ZULM) and appears to be a rare and certainly not a modern usage.

redeeming the evil] from his wrongdoer and assisting him against him)⁶³. These observations suggest that ZULM (together with other frames that inherit from it) referred to social transactions between *peers* in Classical Arabic.

4.3 ZULM between psychology and morale

The Islamic normative discourse portrays ZULM as an immanent characteristic of human psyche:

...fa-inna az-zulma tabī‘a bašariyya tanzi‘u ilayhā an-nafs, wa tanhadiru ilayhā aṭ-ṭabā‘i‘, fa-hiya jibilla mutajaḍḍira fī nafs al-insān “wa ḥamalahā al-insānu innahu kāna zalūman jahūlan”⁶⁴

...for ZULM [is] human nature [that] the soul yearns/is inclined to, and the characters roll down to it, and it is an innate quality/natural disposition⁶⁵ rooted in human soul “and the man bore it, indeed he was *zalūm* (adjective cognate of ZULM. – A. B.) and ignorant” (Quran 33:72).

It is notable how the language of simple physical reality is metaphorically deployed to construct human inner world, where psychological predisposition is represented as the natural downward rolling tendency of rounded objects placed on top of a slope. ZULM, by entailment, appears to be located at the bottom of the universe of human soul⁶⁶, while its supposed prevalence among the humans is accounted for by a universal natural pull akin to the law of gravitation.

The belief in the natural inclination of the human psyche to ZULM is also reflected in its association with a group of lexis functioning as occasional synonyms to the derivatives of $\sqrt{z}lm$ but originating from

⁶³ Lisān al-‘arab. Beirut: Dār Šādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.; vol. Zā’.

⁶⁴ <http://www.soonaa.com/vb/showthread.php?t=10423>

⁶⁵ An on-line dictionary www.almaany.com, which incorporates a broad range of classical and modern Arabic dictionaries, cites *ḥilqa* (creation, innate peculiarity of character, natural disposition, nature etc. – H. Wehr. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. Ed. J. Milton Cowan. Spoken Languages Inc., Ithaca, NY 1976) as an equivalent to this relatively rare word.

⁶⁶ *Vices* in this metaphorical model are placed at the bottom of Soul as Container, while virtues are at the top, which complies with spatial metaphors GOOD is UP and BAD is DOWN as described in Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 2003. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

the semantic domain of psychological and socio-psychological states and acts, e.g. *bağā/bağy* (*seek, desire*, but with the preposition *'alā – upon, against – also oppress, commit outrage*), and *ğāšam/ğāšm* (*treat unjustly or tyrannically, to wrong, oppress*, but also *to act thoughtlessly, haphazardly*, with the latter in all probability being the original meaning of the verb)⁶⁷. We will note here in passing that through the periphery of the root $\sqrt{\text{bgy}}$ ZULM appears to connect to the other part of its rather frequent collocation in the political discourse – FASĀD (*corruption, moral decay*)⁶⁸.

Physical strength or other material *abilities* of an individual are also believed to be a factor of ZULM. This appears to be quite coherent with the above stated belief in the psychological inclination of human psyche to ZULM: once an individual has a material capacity to *oppress* or *wrong* other people he will feel an even stronger pull of this evil force on him. Here is a very common Islamic admonition to those who might be tempted by their excessive abilities to oppress others⁶⁹: *iḏā da'atka qudratuka 'alā zulm an-nās fa-taḏakkir qudrat allāh 'alayka* (if your power/ability has called you to *wrong* the people, remember the power/ability of Allah upon you).

The natural attraction toward ZULM that people ostensibly harbor may justify (or rather be justified by) the presence of evil in the mundane world but it is certainly not presented as a cultural license for the Agent of ZULM. All nominations associated with this semantic role, including *zālim*, *jā'ir* and *tāgiya* convey the idea of strongly negative evaluation tantamount to *moral condemnation*. ZULM is related to the domain of ethical/moral terms not only through its Agent but also through its Patient slot. In the political discourse, the damage/loss caused by ZULM appears to be more often of moral rather than material nature, cf.:

...sa-astašhadu bi-ḥalaqa min barnāmaj fī al-maydān allaḏī šāraktu fī taqḏīmihi 'alā qanāt at-taḥrīr (...) qumtu fihā bi-iṭārat qaḏiyat zulm

⁶⁷ For the sake of economy here we have used English equivalents list borrowed from the relatively concise Wehr, H. 1976. *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. Edited by J. Milton Cowan. 3rd ed. Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, Inc.

⁶⁸ Cf. examples (1), (2) and (3) in the Introduction.

⁶⁹ The phrase has returned about 168,000 results on Google search as of 8 April, 2016.

aš-šuhadā' alladīna saqaṭū amām aqsām aš-šurṭa wa at-tafrīq baynahum wa baqiyyat aš-šuhadā' bi-ittihāmāt kāḍiba tankur kayf kānat al-aqsām salhānāt li-t-ta'ḍīb wa az-ẓulm...⁷⁰

...I will cite as evidence an episode of the program 'In the Maidan' in whose presentation I have participated on Tahrir channel (...) in [which] I have raised the issue of ZULM [against] the martyrs, who had fallen in front of police stations and the differentiation between them and the rest of martyrs on [the ground of] false accusation [which] deny how the police stations had been slaughterhouses for torture and ZULM...

Obviously, the deceased martyrs cannot have been deprived of anything material, they are, however, believed to be capable of sustaining some profound *immaterial loss*, for although not stating it explicitly the paragraph implies that ZULM has affected somehow the *moral persona* of the dead (something that in a similar English context may have been described as *pride* or *good name*). When it comes to the living people, ZULM is also associated with the subjective feeling of moral pains and humiliation, conveyed by the intonation, with which the often-heard Arabic phrase *anā maẓlūm* (lit. I am wronged) is usually pronounced. Pragmatically, this phrase ordinarily functions as an opening to complaint⁷¹.

The list of idioms based on the derivatives of \sqrt{zlm} includes a question phrase (*hal*) *X zālim aw (am) maẓlūm* (is X a wrongdoer or a wronged one – i.e. an Agent or a Patient of ZULM), which appears to be a frequent occurrence in political media discourse⁷² and may be asked in relation to an individual, a thing or an abstract notion (the latter being the case of the metaphor of personification), cf. *Aḥmad Šaḥfīq zālim am maẓlūm* (is Aḥmad Šaḥfīq wrongdoer or wronged one?)⁷³, *at-tūktūk zālim am maẓlūm* (is auto rickshaw wrongdoer or wronged one?)⁷⁴, *at-tārīḥ zālim am maẓlūm* (is history wrongdoer or

⁷⁰ <http://goo.gl/YTaVp0>

⁷¹ A specific type of complaint called *tazallum* or *ẓulāma*, which we have discussed in section 4.2 above.

⁷² As of 22 June, 2016, the Google search based on Egyptian sources only returned 7,440 results for *zālim aw maẓlūm* and 511 more for the synonymous phrase *zālim am maẓlūm*.

⁷³ A title on <http://www.masralarabia.com/> – see <http://goo.gl/1P1tdJ>

⁷⁴ A title on http://www.almessa.net.eg/main_messa.asp?v_article_id=207326#.Vr3Yf1R96k2

wronged one?)⁷⁵. The idiomaticity of the phrase *zālim aw maẓlūm* could probably be attributed to the power of a frequently cited hadith *unşur aḥāka zāliman aw maẓlūman* (support your brother [whether] as wrongdoer or wronged one)⁷⁶, which may even appear in political media discourse in a paraphrased form, cf.: *sa'd ad-dīn ibrahīm: dāliyā ziyāda tunāşir as-sīsī zāliman aw maẓlūman* (Sa'd ad-Din Ibrahim: Daliya Ziyada supports Sisi [whether he is] the wrongdoer or the wronged one)⁷⁷. The salience of the question phrase points to an interesting quality of ZULM – its universal applicability as a standard of measurement, reflecting a panmoralist view of the world, and a rather polarized one at that.

Such panmoralist perspective is reflected in other Islamic normative texts as reflected in the following hadith: *la-zawāl ad-dunyā ah-wan 'alā aḷḷāhi 'azza wa jalla min safk dam muslim bi-ğayr ḥaqq* (surely the demise of this world is lesser for Allah Almighty than spilling of a Muslim's blood unjustly – *lit.* without right)⁷⁸.

Here is an interesting *hadith* text, which effectively implies a vision of human society as interconnected through and through by relationships, in which everyone is simultaneously Patient and Agent of ZULM toward each other, cf.:

idā ḥalaşa al-mu'minūna min an-nār ḥubisū bi-qantara bayna al-jannati wa an-nār fa-yataqāşşūna maẓālima kānat baynahum fī ad-dunyā ḥattā idā naqū wa huḍḍibū uđina lahum bi-duḥūl al-janna⁷⁹

⁷⁵ An article title by a well-known Egyptian 20th cent. author Abbās Maḥmūd al-Aqqād published in 1953. – <http://www.hindawi.org/blogs/51357195/>

⁷⁶ Şaḥīḥ al-Buḥārī, chapter Kitāb al-Maẓālim (the book of wrongdoings/unjust deeds), item 2311. – <https://goo.gl/9omyTc>.

⁷⁷ <http://goo.gl/YOCsQ> It is interesting to note that the paraphrased version of the often cited hadith apparently disregards the usual Islamic jurists' interpretation that the requirement to support 'your brother' while he is doing something wrong should be fulfilled by 'preventing him from doing it'.

⁷⁸ Cited in the 'Declaration of Saudi Scholars on the Events in Egypt of 8 August, 2013' (*bayān al-'ulamā' as-sa'ūdiyyin ḥawla aḥdāt mişr*) published at <http://www.aljazeera.net> – to access the text go to <http://goo.gl/krCVkp>

⁷⁹ Hadith 2308 in Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī. Dār ar-Rayyān li-t-Turāt. 1407 h./1986 m. http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=4432&idto=4433&bk_no=52&ID=1549#docu

If the Muslims escape from the fire (*i.e.* hell) they will be held at a bridge between the paradise and fire (hell) and *retaliate to each other*⁸⁰ *wrongdoings* (a cognate of *zulm*) [that] were between them in [this] world (*i.e.* in their worldly existence) until they become pure and were rectified (corrected, set right, improved) and it is permitted to them to enter the paradise...

Al-‘Asqalānī’s commentary to this text⁸¹ contains a characteristic definition of *mazālim* as *ism li-mā uḥiḍa bi-ḡayr haqq* (name for what was taken without right)⁸². The cited hadith points to the coherence and even complementarity embedded in in the Islamic religious discourses, between the notions of ZULM and another concept that appears to be highly salient in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring – QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION)⁸³. What binds the two concepts together could be described as *a moral economy principle*, which is quite similar to *debts should be repaid* principle, much and long discussed in the European books on ethics⁸⁴.

The belief that ZULM accounts permeating the entire social fabric can only be settled at the end of times elevates ZULM to a level of transcendental phenomenon.

5. Interdiscursivity: religious discourses and the domain of politics

An individual concept may vary significantly across different discourses, while maintaining an unmistakable family resemblance. The cross-discursive differences may also be semiotized both to modify and enrich the meaning of the concept in the target discourse, such as

⁸⁰ This meaning is expressed by the reciprocal 6th verbal form, cognate of *qiṣāṣ* (retaliation).

⁸¹ The so called *ḥāṣiya* (sidenote).

⁸² Ibid. p. 114.

⁸³ On QIṢĀṢ cf. Alexander Bogomolov, *An Eye for an Eye and the Struggle for Power in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring*. Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia. Vol. XV, p. 13–33.

⁸⁴ See, for instance, Rosalind Hursthouse. What does the Aristotelian Phronimos know? in L. Jost, J. Wuerth (eds.) *Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 42, where this principle is cited in discussion of the classical Greek concept of *phronesis* (prudence, moral intelligence).

political discourse, or more specifically, the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring, and help achieve certain communicative goals. In this section we will illustrate two basic contentions:

1. The semantics of ZULM in general political discourse was affected profoundly by what is known as *political Islam* (a.k.a. Islamist) discourses, which we believe to essentially represent a blending of the Islamic normative and left-leaning political discourses.

2. The events of January 25 revolution found reflection in a set of disparate discourses including the normative and the devotional Islamic ones (more specifically, the genre of mosque sermons), the leftist and liberal political discourses. All these discourses operate independently, each in their specific social context, but are accessible to overlapping audiences within the speech community. They also blend in such common sites as the media, where they contribute to the production of the new revolutionary discourse. The manner, in which key concepts, such as ZULM, function in the revolutionary discourse, is effectively a resultant of these other, more stable discourses with long history of circulation in the speech community. The interplay of meanings, which occur in this manner, does not result from a deliberate action in the sense of any individual or group authorship, (although an element of individual initiative cannot be excluded either), but rather of a collective activity guided by a sense of commonality of communicative purpose.

5.1 *Signposts on the road*: how the Islamist discourse reshaped ZULM

According to S. Khatab, a key ideologue of modern political Islam Sayyid Qutb was using the terms ‘tyranny’ and ‘oppression’ to describe the contemporary sociopolitical order in Egypt as early as in 1925–1939⁸⁵. In doing so he certainly was not alone. Much later, Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, a leader and ideologue of a violent extremist group that assassinated the president Anwar as-Sadat, during his official interrogation in 1982 also referred to ‘the *oppression*

⁸⁵ Sayed Khatab. *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb. The theory of jāhilyyah*. Routledge. London, NY, 2006, p. 62; although Khatab does not provide Arabic equivalents for these terms, it appears to be clear that by the latter term he must have meant *zulm*.

and the violence of the State against sharia and against Muslims⁸⁶ (emphasis added. – A. B.). The innovation that Qutb and other proponents of his political theory, which construed the contemporary Arab states as essentially un-Islamic tyrannies, which the true Muslims should oppose⁸⁷, compared to the traditional normative Islamic discourse, which still continues to treat the concept as a social transaction among peers, was that it had developed ZULM into a brief theory of *power* and *state*. Here is a paragraph from Qutb's last and arguably the most important book *Ma'ālim fī aṭ-Ṭarīq* (Signposts on the Road)⁸⁸ describing an ideal society:

wa taṭahhar al-mujtama' min az-zulm bi-jumlatihi, wa qāma an-nizām al-islāmī ya'dil bi-'adl al-lāh wa yazin bi-mīzān al-lāh wa yarfā' al-'adāla al-ijtimā'īyya bi-smi-llāh...⁸⁹

and the society was purified from ZULM in its entirety and the Islamic order had risen [which] administers justice by Allah's justice and weighs by Allah's scales and raises the social justice in the name of Allah...

The paragraph characteristically combines an approximation of Muslim sermon style with terms borrowed from secular leftist discourses. Note particularly the notion of *social justice*, which would become a prominent idea in the January 25 revolutionary discourse and part of the revolution's official motto. The narrowing of the much wider moral and even eschatological notion of ZULM to the only type of relationship, viz. that between the powers that be and their disenfranchised subjects, could only happen through a blending of the religious and revolutionary leftist discourses. The two discourses

⁸⁶ Sayed Khatib. *The Power of Sovereignty*. The political and ideological philosophy of Sayyid Qutb. Routledge. London, NY, 2006, p. 205.

⁸⁷ The theory built around the idea that the contemporary Muslim societies had deviated from their religion to the extent of becoming a type of *jāhilyyah* (ignorance, barbarianism), the terms used in classical texts in reference to the pre-Islamic Arabs.

⁸⁸ Gilles Kepel has called 'Ma'ālim...' 'What is to be done' of the Islamist movement (Gilles Kepel. *Jihad: expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*. Editions Gallimard, 2000; cited through Russian translation, Zhil Kepel. *Dzhikhad*. Moscow, Lodomir, 2004, p. 31).

⁸⁹ Sayyid Qutb. *Ma'ālim fī aṭ-Ṭarīq*. Bayrūt, al-Qāhira, Dār aš-Šurūq, 1979, p. 29.

share a set of important underlying presumptions, such as a simplified conception of power relations, the wholesale rejection of the status quo and the belief that history is divided in phases defined characterized by different levels of social justice, the belief that a rapid transition from a worse to a better type of society may be brought about by a deep indoctrination and mobilization of masses, culminating in revolution. In contrast to the leftist idea of progress, the Muslim history according to Qutb appears to be cyclic. Qutb's greatest ideological innovation was defining the contemporary Muslim politics and society in terms of the pre-Islamic period of so called Jāhiliyya (Ignorance). It is in Qutb's conception that ZULM assumed its function of political term, a key element in the definition of the old *unjust* political system as opposed to the new one that true Muslims should aspire, cf. the following characteristic description of Jāhiliyya:

kān at-tazālum fāšiyy^{an} fī al-mujtama', tu'abbir 'anhu fikrat aš-šā'ir zuhayr bnu abī sulmā: wa man lam yaḍud 'an ḥawḍihi bi-silāḥih yuhaddam wa man lam yazlim yuzlam wa yu'abbir 'anhu al-qawl al-muta'āraf 'alayhi fī al-jāhiliyya "unṣur aḥāka zāliman aw mazlūman"⁹⁰.

wronging each other (the reciprocal 6th form of \sqrt{zlm}) was spread in the society, as expressed by an opinion of the poet Zuhayr Abu-Sulma: and [he] who has not defended himself by his weapon would be destroyed and [he] who has not wronged would be wronged [himself], which is expressed in the common saying in [the times of] Jahiliyya "support you brother [whether] as wrongdoer or the wronged [one]"⁹¹.

Following in the leftists steps, Qutb redesigned an essentially religious ethics notion of innate human Injustice, conceived of as an atemporal quality, into an ideological term referenced to specific historic period and political condition, just like the leftists did with the term Oppression. He has actually helped make ZULM the best Arabic equivalent of the latter, while simultaneously reinforcing its religious connotations⁹². As we see, without being fully consistent in substance

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 26–27.

⁹¹ As we have seen in Section 5.1 above the cited phrase is actually part of the hadith, rather than 'common saying', for reference see footnote 81.

⁹² We may have exaggerated Qutb's role in effecting a shift in the meaning and function of an important cultural concept, but irrespective of whether he could bring about this change alone in his capacity of a single most important Arabic Islamist author of his days, this does not deny the validity of

and tenor, the leftist and Islamist discourses appear to be quite coherent in their most basic layout⁹³. The January 25 – February 11, 2011 protests in Cairo's Tahrir square provided a unique site for the continued encounter and cross-breeding these two discourses.

What Qutb was faced with was basically the same dilemma that the modern revolutionary socialists, the true *šabāb at-tawra* (the revolutionary youth) and its ultimate driving force, faced when in early 2011 they were discussing the legitimacy of using the strongly Islamic normative concept of QIṢĀṢ (retaliation) as a revolutionary slogan. Without even thinking about Qutb they followed his recipe in trying to sell the basics of the revolt to a crowd, whose only reference base in the sociopolitical sphere was their religion. Qutb, though, seems to have done it a bit more decisively and wholeheartedly.

It is for the concepts with long history of circulation in the religious discourse, such as ZULM and QIṢĀṢ, that it becomes possible to view politics from an eschatological perspective, and for the religious discourses to directly interfere in the political domain. In the course of January 25 revolution, mosques functioned as a key instrument of mass mobilization and sites of discursive defiance. Sermon (*ḥuṭba*) and *du'ā* (supplication or invocation as opposed to a more formulaic prayer, *ṣalāt*) may in this context be seen as genres mediating between the Islamic normative (by extension also Islamist) and political discourses. As a speech genre, *sermon* has many constraints, e.g. it gives strong preference to generic names as opposed to nominations with unambiguously specific referents, such as proper names. Even stricter constraints apply to *du'ā*. It is, therefore, significant, if *du'ā* does include some terms resonating with wider political discussion of the day, such as *dawlat aẓ-ẓulm* (state of ZULM), cf.:

...al-lāhumma ka-mā *azalta dawlat aẓ-ẓulm wa aṭ-ṭuġyān..* fa-atimm
 ‘alā miṣra ni‘mat al-amn wa al-īmān.. wa as-salāma wa al-islām..
 wa asbiġ ‘alayhā ni‘amaka zāhiratan wa bāṭinatan.. wa urzuqnā fihā
 al-amn wa al-amān.. wa al-‘ayš fī salām..⁹⁴

change as such as well as the role of the Islamist discourse in effecting it and the appropriateness of citing Qutb as an illustration.

⁹³ At the level of frame-semantic structures and associated ideas that shape them.

⁹⁴ An excerpt from a 2,235 word long prayer (*du'ā*) recited by Sheikh Muḥammad Jibrīl on Laylat al-Qadr (Night of Power) on the 26th of Ramadan

...o Allah, as you have eliminated the *state of ZULM and despotism..*
accomplish over Egypt the grace of security and faith.. and health and
Islam.. and bestow upon it your graces perspicuous and innermost..
and provide in it security and safety... and life in peace..

Powerful as they are as instruments of political persuasion, the devotional texts do not make the news, and, therefore, are seldom cited in the common media discourse. Texts of sermons and *du'ā* have nevertheless become widely available beyond their immediate mosque congregations, eagerly sought after and traded across wide audiences of devoted Muslims with the advent of electronic media.

Although not strictly overlapping in terms of shared public discussion sites and textual dimension, albeit connected through a common set of key concepts, the two types of discourses – religious (normative and devotional) and political – may function in counterpoint to each other as two distinct but complementary⁹⁵ modes of public commentary over the same sociopolitical reality⁹⁶ with different sets of speakers but largely the same recipients.

Elements of the religious discourses interfere with the political discourse more directly in what could be described as *citational mode*. For instance, an apparently high occurrence of the 2nd person plural form *tazālamū* in the Egyptian segment of Internet⁹⁷, at a closer look, can be mostly accounted for by citations of a single text of Sunnah *yā 'ibādī innī ḥarramtu aẓ-ẓulma 'alā nafsī wa ja'altuhu muḥarraman fa-lā tazālamū* (oh my servants, I have prohibited

(26 August), 2011; it is believed that good deeds (notably, prayers) performed on this occasion are worth more than those accomplished over one thousand months as according to Quran 97:3, *laylatu-l-qadr ḥayrun min alfi šahrin* (the night of Power is better than a thousand months) <http://www.jebril.com/ar/supPLICATIONS/quran-completion/doaa-1432>

⁹⁵ The two discourses serve different but compatible functions, e.g. the religious discourse has a strong *regulatory* dimension, greater *persuasiveness*, but its referential scope is limited compared to the common political discourse – it cannot the political process in detail.

⁹⁶ Cf. the notion of *meta-cultural commentary* in D. Carbaugh. Cultural Discourse Analysis: Pragmatics of Social Interaction. In Alessandro Capone and Jacob L. Mey (Eds.), *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*, p. 566.

⁹⁷ 82,700 results on Google search as of 12 March, 2016.

ZULM upon myself and made it prohibited, therefore, do not *wrong each other*)⁹⁸. As an instance of so called *sacred* (or *divine*) *hadith* (*hadīṭ qudsī*)⁹⁹ this text speaks to humans in the name of Allah, in which perspective both the Agents and Patients of ZULM appear to be equal. When cited in the contemporary political discourse characterized by a significant power disparity between Zālim and Maẓlūm, such texts serve a socio-pragmatic purpose of empowering the oppressed against oppressor, by putting them both rhetorically on an equal footing.

6. ZULM in modern political discourse

6.1 ZULM and Power

Entities/social actors representing (political) POWER – Ruler, Regime or State (*ḥākīm, niẓām, dawla*)¹⁰⁰ in the discourse of the January 25 revolution, and earlier political opposition discourses appear to be closely associated with the concept of ZULM, cf.:

su‘ālī yattajih ilā as-sāda aṣḥāb al-qirār wa an-nufūḍ fī niẓām al-ḥukm wa huwa bi-ḥtiṣār: li-mādā tatamādawna fī zulm an-nās wa fī al-mumārasāt al-qam‘iyya al-mumanhaja ‘alā raġm min taṣā‘ud al-ğaqḍ aš-ša‘bī (...)? da‘kum min ḥurāfat al-qum‘ li-ḍamān al-amn...¹⁰¹

my question is addressed to (*lit.* is heading toward) gentlemen decision makers and influencers in the ruling regime (*lit.* regime of rule) and it is briefly [as follows]: why are you persisting in ZULM [against] the people and in systematic repressive practices despite the rising anger of the people (...)? Spare us from the myth of oppression for the sake of security...

ZULM often features as a definitive – if not the only – characteristic of the pre-revolutionary State. The phrase *dawlat aẓ-zulm* (the state of ZULM) returned about 11,500 results for the Egyptian sites,

⁹⁸ Cf. Šurūḥ al-Ḥadīṭ, Jāmi‘ al-‘Ulūm wa al-Ḥikam. Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī. Mu‘assasat ar-Risāla, 2001/1422 h., Item 24. – http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=125&idto=130&bk_no=81&ID=26

⁹⁹ *Sacred* or *divine* *hadith* (*ḥadīṭ qudsī*) is a type of *hadith* containing the direct speech of Allah as opposed to the bulk of *hadith*, which comprises acts and sayings of the prophet Muḥammad.

¹⁰⁰ These are the key entities (*social roles*) that appear in various context to specify the broader concept of political POWER.

¹⁰¹ <http://goo.gl/74I6gh>

as of 25 March 2015. The *state of ZULM* is cited as affectively the *reason* behind the revolution¹⁰², cf.:

tilka ad-dawla allatī taḥnuq aš-ša‘b wa tata‘ālā ‘alayh t̄āra ḍiddahā aš-ša‘b al-miṣrī bi-rummatihā fī yanāyir, lam takun aṭ-ṭawra ḍidd mubārak šaḥṣiyyan, wa lākin kānat ḍidd dawla zālīma bi-jamī‘ mu’assasātihā wa aḥizatihā al-idāriyya, wa lan yuktamal intiṣār aṭ-ṭawra dūna hadm dawlat aṣ-ṣulm (...) ḥattā tastaṭī‘ aṭ-ṭawra an tabnī dawlatahā al-badīla...¹⁰³

That state, which strangles the people and rises above it, the whole of the Egyptian people has made revolution against it in January, [which] was not revolution against Mubarak personally, but was against *oppressive* (cognate of *zulm*. – A. B.) *state* with all its institutions and administrative bodies, and the victory of the revolution will never be complete until the ruining of the state of ZULM (...) until the revolution will be able to build its alternative state...

It is this construction *dawlat aṣ-ZULM* that helps reconstrue ZULM as a concept belonging to the domain of politics as opposed to its original domain of inner person and morale, which we discussed above.

In line with spatial metaphor POWER is UP¹⁰⁴ the *state of ZULM* is represented in the political discourse as a *high vertical construction* (an entity that stands tall but may shake and fall), cf.:

kull mā ḥadaṭ munḍu al-laḥza al-ūlā ḥattā at-tanaḥḥī lam yakun illā al-jawla al-ūlā fī al-ma‘araka al-fāšila, al-jawla allatī ḥusimat li-šālīḥ aṭ-ṭawra ‘indamā faqadat dawlat aṣ-ṣulm ittizānahā wa tarannaḥat...¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² This appears to be the key nomination expressing this idea in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring, by far outscoring the 2nd most frequent synonymous nomination – *nizām aṣ-ṣulm* (the regime of ZULM), which has returned about 2,920 results on Google search and *an-nizām aṣ-zālīm* – about 1,970 results (as of May 6, 2016).

¹⁰³ An article titled ‘The State and the Army... between ruining and construction’ (ad-dawla wa al-jayš ... bayn al-hadm wa al-binā’). In al-Yasār aṭ-Ṭawrī (The Revolutionary Left), January 31, 2012 <https://elthawry.wordpress.com/2012/01/31>

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 2003. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff & Johnson cite a number of metaphors, which may be summarized as metaphors of Power, e.g. FORCE is UP (p. 15), HIGH STATUS is UP (p. 16), CONTROL is UP (p. 17).

¹⁰⁵ Article title *aṭ-ṭawra mustamirra* (the revolution continues), 20 January 2013. – <http://www.ansarportsaid.net/Visitors/349/Details.aspx>

all what happened since the first moment until the resignation [of Mubarak] had been nothing but the first round in the decisive battle, the round that was decided to the benefit of the revolution when the state of ZULM lost its equilibrium and swung.

In modern usage ZULM also is metaphorically represented as an *object falling from above*, cf.:

su'āl yadūr bi-dīhnī wa rubba-mā bi-aḏhān al-kaṭīrīn min al-mutābī'in li-mā yaḡrī bi-miṣr al-kināna wa as- su'āl huwa hal waqa' zulum 'alā ar-ra'īs al-miṣrī muḥammad mursī?¹⁰⁶

A question is on my mind (*lit.* turning around my mind) and probably on the minds of many of [those who] follow what is going on in Egypt al-Kinana (a traditional epithet of the country. – A. B.) and the question is whether ZULM had *fallen* on the Egyptian president Muḥammad Mursi?

Not only ZULM may *fall* on a person, but one may also *fall under* ZULM (which is still not incoherent with the idea of *object falling from above*), cf.:

wa aḏāfa ad-dīb ḥilāl murāfa'atihi amām maḥkamat jināyāt al-qāhira (...) anna mubārak waqa' taḥt aḏ-zulum al-bayyin wa lākin lam yahtazz imānuhu li-l-laḥza wāḥida bi-anna al-lāha sawf yaṣuruhu wa anna al-qaḏā' sawfa yunṣifuh¹⁰⁷

And ad-Dib added during his presentation in front of the Criminal Court of Cairo (...) that Mubarak had *fallen under* an obvious ZULM, but his faith had not shaken [even] for a single moment in that Allah would support him and the justice would be fair to him.

Causing ZULM is metaphorically represented as *letting fall* (from somewhere above). It appears that although ZULM is caused by a human agency the relation between it and the ultimate source of ZULM is indirect, it is not a human action that represents ZULM in a direct sense, but ZULM as a result of a certain type of action, cf.:

fa-al-fi'l nafsuh mumkin an yuqi' zulum^{an} wa mumkin an yuqi' 'adl^{an}, fa-qatl an-nafs awqa' aḏ-zulum 'alā al-maqtūl wa qatl al-qātil awqa' al-'adl 'alā al-qātil¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ An op-ed by Rātib 'Ababna. With impartiality and objectivity ... was Mursi wronged? (bi-tajjarud wa al-mawdū'iyya... hal zulima al-mursī), 5 July, 2013. – <http://www.maqalaty.com/41444.html>

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.elfagr.org/654378>

¹⁰⁸ <https://goo.gl/3mfxmS>

For the same act may *bring down* ZULM and may *bring down* JUSTICE, as the manslaughter (*lit.* killing the soul) brought down ZULM upon the killer and killing the killer brought down JUSTICE upon the killer.

In Arabic, there is at least one more trouble that may befall an individual or a human collective, which could metaphorically *fall* upon them. In this case clearly the *falling* is caused by an entity, placed high above, i.e. metaphorically, in the position of POWER. The name of this type of trouble is *punishment* (‘uqūba) cf.:

al-ahlī yūqī ‘uqūba kabīra ‘alā gālī ba’d tajāwuzihi ma‘a ḥusayn as-sayyid¹⁰⁹

Al-Ahli (sport club) imposes (*lit. is letting fall*) big punishment on Gali over his violation with Husain as-Sayyid.

Being UP, from where it *falls* or is *helped to fall*, if not directly places ZULM in association with some sort of POWER, then in the space beyond human control (normally we don’t look up when we move around and we can’t reach up above our own height), hence falling from above may metaphorically express FATALITY¹¹⁰. In the example below ZULM has already occurred and its Patient is described as being *under* it. ZULM features here in a context similar to the word *yoke* in English, for which it could be substituted easily should the paragraph be given a ‘literary’ translation, cf.:

filastīn al-wahīda bi-l-‘ālam allatī tarzaḥ taḥt zulm al-iḥtilāl wa ‘unṣuriyyatihi... wa isrā’īl tazunn annahā fawq al-jamī‘ wa yajib ijbāruhā ‘alā irjā ‘al-ḥaqq li-aṣḥābihā¹¹¹

Palestine [is] the only [one] in the world, which [is] languishing *under* ZULM of occupation and its racism... and Israel thinks itself *above* all and it must be forced to *return the right (ḥaqq) to its holders*.

ZULM, that may well appear to be redundant here to a European translator, is in fact the principle that indirectly guides the choice of

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/983506>

¹¹⁰ Metaphor FATAL is FALLING FROM ABOVE seems to be another conceptual universal as it occurs in many languages other than Arabic (Ukrainian, Russian, English, Persian, German to name but a few).

¹¹¹ The phrase attributed to the Arab League Secretary General Nabil Arabi features as a title of a news item at <http://www.marsadmasry.com/news/3610>

elements in what may otherwise appear to be a descriptive phrase. Racism here specifies the moral aspect of ZULM¹¹². ZULM comes from above i.e. from places beyond human control. Both constituents of the concept – the idea of *moral pains* sustained by the Patient of ZULM and link to POWER/FATALITY as its ultimate cause are again emphasized by the choice of *razaḥ* as predicate, which we have translated as *languish* for a lack of a better option, but whose semantics is based on a spatial metaphor BAD is DOWN¹¹³, which is also reflected in the preposition *taḥt* (under) that goes with the verb. While Israel is presented as a source or cause of ZULM, it only *thinks* that it is *above all*, a phrase clearly meant to rhetorically portray it as less powerful. What it has to do is to *return the right* (ḥaqq), which is part of the standard definition of ZULM reversed¹¹⁴. The entailment of this line of spatial metaphors applied to ZULM is that to *overcome* it one needs to *lift* it, cf.:

taḥt šī'ār munāṣarat al-'adl al-yūnīsīf tuṭliq ḥamla li-raf' aḏ-ḏulm 'an al-atfāl al-akṭar faqr^{an} bi-mušāarakat mašāhīr al-'ālam...¹¹⁵

Under the slogan of 'Supporting Justice' UNICEF is launching a campaign to lift ZULM from the poorest children with the participation of the world's celebrities...

While ZULM within this set of spatial-mechanic metaphors is represented as a heavy object that falls from above and may press down its Patient, it takes someone POWERful to *lift* it. It is therefore not accidental that some sort of *authority* (institution, official etc.) would normally feature as the Agent of *lifting* ZULM.

¹¹² I.e. it relates as cause to effect with *moral humiliation* of being *mazlūm*, which we discussed in Section 5.1 above.

¹¹³ Cf. glosses provided by Lane with reference to classical Tāj al-'Arūs: Lane: *she (a camel) fell down* (for a fem. verbal form. – A. B.), *by reason of fatigue, emaciated or by reason of fatigue or emaciation or by reason of fatigue and emaciation or clave to the ground and had no power to rise; said of a man: He became weak, and what was in his hand went from him* – Edward William Lane. An Arabic-English Lexicon. Beirut, Lebanon: Librairie du Liban. 1980/1997.

¹¹⁴ Cf. the relationship between ZULM and the notion of *ḥaqq* as 'property' and 'right', which we discussed in 4.1.

¹¹⁵ <http://s.youm7.com/2475989>

6.2 Escape routes: ZULM and TIME

The notion of *dawlat az-ZULM* (the state of ZULM), which is very salient in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution, appears to describe an overwhelming and total political reality that no one seems to be able to escape. Yet while *the state of ZULM* is constructed in spatial terms, its referent being a country – Egypt, a whole set of idioms in Arabic portray the fourth dimension – temporal – as a likely remedy from ZULM.

A few stable collocations point to the fact that the temporal dimension of ZULM represents a matter of keen interest and conscious public reflection for Egyptians¹¹⁶, highlighting what appears to be a popular belief in the *transient nature* of ZULM, which may be an extension of a more generic belief in the imminent end of sufferings or the transience of all other mundane phenomena. Indeed, the phrase may often be used as a solace to those, who are in trouble. Here are some of these collocations: (*dawlat*) *az-zulm sā'a*¹¹⁷ ([the state of] ZULM [is] one hour), (*kull*) *zālim lahu nihāya*¹¹⁸ (wrongdoer has an end – meaning ‘is not immortal’ or ‘may not forever go unpunished’), occasionally also in a plural form as *li-kull az-zālimīn lahum nihāya* (all wrongdoers have an end), and, finally, (*az*)-*zulm lahu nihāya*¹¹⁹ (ZULM has an end). The idea had been so popular during the heyday of the revolution that later, in the context of anti-Sisi protests by Muslim Brotherhood supporters, the phrase *az-zulm lahu nihāya* even became part of a vernacular Arabic slogan that protesters chanted on the streets – *az-zulm lahu nihāya wa al-ḥurriya gāyya gāyya*¹²⁰ (ZULM

¹¹⁶ Again, in our sample as analyzed here, we have included Egyptian material only, bearing in mind the need to ensure a certain unity of sociopolitical context, which appears to be essential for the manner, in which concepts function in the political discourse.

¹¹⁷ 3,700 total results with 3,600 results for the extended phrase with the head word *dawla* (state), as of 22 May 2016.

¹¹⁸ 1,840 Google search results as of 22 May 2016.

¹¹⁹ 133 results for the indefinite form, and 699 – for the definite one on Google search, as of 22 May 2016.

¹²⁰ A news item titled ‘ZULM has an End and Freedom is Coming’ – Slogan of the Ismailiya Oppositioners’ (*az-zulm lahu nihāya wa al-ḥurriya gāyya hitāf mu'āriḍī al-ismā'īliyya*), dated 14 February, 1015 on <http://www.masralarabia.com/> – see <http://goo.gl/MuSish>

has an end and the freedom is coming, coming). It is interesting to note that *ẓulm* in this context is contrasted to *ḥurriya*, a key value concept of the revolutionary discourse and part of its officially cited motto *‘ayš, ḥurriya, karāma insāniyya, ‘adāla ijtimā‘iyya* (bread, freedom, human dignity, social justice), as opposed to its formal antonym – *‘adl*. The two concept here affectively tag the pre-revolutionary *past* and the aspired post-revolutionary *future*.

It is not merely due to the relative stability (idiomaticity) or the frequency of these phrases that we identify the idea of the *transient nature* of *ẒULM* as a *belief*. We base our conclusion that this idea does represent a belief on the linguo-pragmatic function that the appropriate phrases assume in the text. They persistently feature in the argumentative and (almost) never in the asserted part of utterances, which may be negated or argued for, i.e. they are used as *proof* and not something that may *need to be proven*. Cf.: *istamirrū fī ʔarīqikum – aẓ-ẓulm lahu nihāya* (continue on your path [for] *ẒULM* has an end)¹²¹. While temporal modifiers easily combine with *ẒULM*, spatial ones, which may be another way of expressing the same idea that *ẒULM* may be constrained, apparently don't. For instance, we found only one instance for a grammatically correct phrase *aẓ-ẓulm lahu ḥudūd* (*ẒULM* has limits, boundaries), which parallels a popular idiom *aš-šabr lahu ḥudūd* (patience has limits). This clear lacuna suggests that *ẒULM* in media and, probably, wider public discussion, is seen from a socially pessimistic perspective as a phenomenon impossible to deal with *hic et nunc*, so overwhelming that it only can go away with time. The only instance of *aẓ-ẓulm lahu ḥudūd* that we found in fact only reinforces this impression as it portrays a reality outside of Egypt in the foreign lands, affectively a Neverland as seen from where the author is situated, cf.:

‘afwan yā sayyidī ar-ra’īs... ašhadu annaka najaḥta fī an yakūna ḥulm bāqī abnā’ī al-waḥīd huwa ar-raḥīl ilā ayy buq‘a fī al-arḍ illā al-waṭan... fa-ba‘duhu kull al-bilād sawā’... tatasawī fihā kull al-ašyā’.. aš-šams wa al-mā’ wa al-hawā’ wa lākin hunāka ajid mā lā ajiduh fī waṭanī: al-amal... furas ‘ādila.. ijthād muṭab.. ḥayā muḥfiza li-ṭ-ṭāqāt.. taḥaddiyāt yaqbiluhā al-minṭaq.. ẓulm lahu ḥudūd...¹²²

¹²¹ <http://www.ansarportsaid.net/News/139480/Default.aspx>

¹²² <http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/622324>

Sorry Mr. President, I witness that you have succeeded in that the only dream of the rest of my sons would be to go to any part (lit. spot) of Earth except the homeland... as after it all countries are the same, everything is equal in them, the sun and the water and the air, but I find there what I don't find in my homeland: the hope, fair chances, effort rewarded, life stimulating energies, challenges, which logic [can] accept, ZULM [which] has limits...

The idea of the *transience* of ZULM appears to resonate with the key theme of what has been dubbed by some as *kifāya* (enough) *rhetoric*, effectively a new trend in the Egyptian pulp fiction, which evolved and gained popularity in the decade preceding the January 25 revolution¹²³. Junge (2015) chose the anti-Mubarak protest slogan of *kifāya!* (enough!)¹²⁴, which 'accurately expresses the tight interaction between political demands and emotional expression', as a tag for this newly identified literary trend, whose key characteristic feature is that '[as] a result of *suffering from social or political injustice* (emphasis added. – A. B. – this sounds as a rather accurate definition of ZULM), the protagonists mostly direct their affects and emotions outwards, to another person or group; they no longer internalize but externalize aggression'. Junge's observation points to dynamics in the emotional reactions and political expectations of the Egyptian public over the late pre-revolutionary period, which explains much in both the public mood and the modality of the revolution. This *growing* sense of *injustice* among Egyptians is also reflected in the Google trend graph for the lexeme *zulm*, which highlights a steady upward dynamic beginning shortly after the 2005 presidential election up until now (2016), with high points on the graph clearly correlating with the peaks of political activity or repressions¹²⁵.

¹²³ Christian Junge. On Affect and Emotion as Dissent: The Kifāya Rhetoric in Pre-Revolutionary Egyptian Literature. Friederike Pannewick, Georges Khalil, Yvonne Albers (Eds.), *Commitment and Beyond. Reflections on/of the Political in Arabic Literature since the 1940s*. Reichert Verlag, Wiesbaden 2015, pp. 253–272.

¹²⁴ The slogan was used as unofficial moniker for the grass-root based Egyptian Movement for Change during the presidential elections of 2005.

¹²⁵ February 2011 – the month of Tahrir square sit-in and Mubarak's resignation, August 2013 – massacre of pro-Mursi rally on Rābi'a al-'Adawiyya square in Cairo, November 2013 – with October – November

The framing of ZULM as a persistent and overwhelming state of affairs in a country with nothing to be done about it *now*, but which will imminently end in the *future*, reflects a somewhat eschatological idea of time reminiscent of religious discourses, which represent time as a segment of unspecified length or rather a vector connecting the two contrasting opposites of everlasting *now*, where things are mostly futile or bad and *hereafter*, where relief from pain, reward and eternal pleasure awaits the faithful. On the other hand, the idea that everything will change with the revolution and a new and better world will come and stay forever is characteristic of revolutionary discourses. The two perspectives are not incoherent, both of them neatly combine in a phrase frequently repeated in the Egyptian media texts, which became one of the revolutionary mantras, – *dawlat az-ẓulm s̄ā'a*, *dawlat al-ḥaqqilā qiyām as-sā'a* (the state of ZULM [is for] an hour, the state of truth/justice [is] until the doomsday)¹²⁶.

6.3 Power and ZULM – a reversed perspective

Our analysis of ZULM in the political discourse would be incomplete should we neglect the other side of the debate, against whom the powerful ZULM rhetoric is effectively directed – the institutions, officials and people governing and symbolically representing the Egyptian state. The purpose of our analysis in this section is to find out how this rhetoric has affected the public self-representation of the Egyptian authorities. The best material to address this point in the context of a study of revolutionary discourse is Mubarak's last speeches¹²⁷ delivered over the 18 days of protests in the Tahrir square in January – February 2011. The speeches represent an interesting mix: while trying

being the period when protesters slain by police in various localities across Egypt became a regular news item.

¹²⁶ Google search for the 2nd part of the phrase *dawlat al-ḥaqq ilā qiyām as-sā'a* (the state of truth/justice [is] until the doomsday) performed on May 31, 2016 returned 1,610 results.

¹²⁷ Mubarak spoke on January 28 – at the heyday of the protests, on February 1 – on the eve of one of the most violent episodes during the 18 days sit-in in Tahrir square – the so called Camel Incident, and on February 10 – just one day before his resignation, which happened on February 11, 2011 and on which occasion a very brief announcement was made on his behalf by Vice President Omar Suleiman.

to dismiss the presupposed accusations without explicitly repeating them, Mubarak still uses a lot of constituent elements of the revolutionary discourse, more often as part of presupposition than explicitly, which he tries to rearrange and re-appropriate in an attempt to justify his remaining in office. Particularly characteristic in that sense is Mubarak's last speech delivered one day before his resignation.

The 'revolutionaries' message addressed to Mubarak is best expressed in the key slogan of the January 25 – February 11 sit-in – *irḥal* (go). Such simple imperative does not presuppose a verbal response. In his speech, Mubarak is trying to reframe the communicative act initiated by 'revolutionaries' as effectively a more cooperative type of exchange by imposing the notion of *national dialog* (al-ḥiwār al-waṭanī). Mubarak's speech is construed as a response to protesters' *demands* (maṭālib), which are not outlined explicitly in the speech. The notion of *maṭālib*, often also *maṭālib at-tawra*, alternating with *aḥdāf at-tawra* (goals of the revolution) is among the frequent occurrences in the discourse of the January 25 revolution. What is usually meant by this notion in later discourse of the revolution is the sequence of value concepts that form part of the popular revolutionary motto 'ayš, ḥurriya, 'adāla ijtmā'iyya, karāma insāniyya (bread, freedom, social justice, human dignity), but also QIŞĀŞ (retaliation)¹²⁸. While acknowledging that *maṭālibukum hiya maṭālib 'ādila wa maşrū'a* (your demands are just and legitimate demands), Mubarak, in an oblique manner, responds to the theme of QIŞĀŞ and the closely interrelated theme of the Martyrs of Revolution (*şuhadā' at-tawra* – both of these concepts are coherent with the scenarios presupposed by ZULM), which he does by committing to 'speedily' investigate the 'events of the last week' in an apparent reference to the police violence against the protesters, cf.: *aşdardu ta'līmātī bi-sur'at al-intihā' min at-taḥqīqāt ḥawl aḥdāṭ al-usbū' al-māḍī* (I have issued my orders for a speedy completion of the investigations on the events of the last week). The emphasis on 'speediness' is not a random embellishment here. By stressing it, Mubarak is affecting empathy with

¹²⁸ On the significance of the concept of QIŞĀŞ for the discourse of January 25 revolution cf. Alexander Bogomolov. An Eye for an Eye and the Struggle for Power in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring. Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia, 2015, Vol. XV, pp. 13–33.

the mounting popular demands of QIṢĀṢ, without naming it explicitly, as according to a popular belief, QIṢĀṢ has to be *speedy* and also *complete* (*sarī'* or *'ājil* and *nājiz* – effective, complete)¹²⁹. Mubarak appears also to eagerly acknowledge the collective *moral pain* – a theme resonating with psychological and moral dimension of ZULM semantics as discussed above.

To overwrite the image of Zālim, Tāgiya (unjust ruler, tyrant), a standard description of all Egyptian presidents in the Islamist discourse, and now in the discourse of the Tahrir square protesters, Mubarak applies the universal metaphor of Ruler as Father. Mubarak, however, does not explicitly describe all Subjects as Children, but singles out Youth, whose role as 'those who led this demand for change', – a clear euphemism of the revolution, Mubarak acknowledges positively. In privileging the YOUTH and seeing it as the agent of Revolution Mubarak fully complies with the conventions, already established, of the revolutionary discourse. Mubarak speaks in an authoritative all-wise manner of a senior man, who always knows better and sees what the young people could not see:

inna miṣra tajtāz^u awqāt^{an} ṣa'ba lā yaṣihū an nasmaḥ^a bi-stimrāriḥā fa-yazdād^u mā alḥaqathu bi-nā wa bi-qtiṣādīnā min aḍrār wa ḥasā'ir yawm^{an} ba'da yawm, wa yantahī bi-miṣr^a al-amr ilā awḍā' yuṣbaḥu ma'ahā aṣ-ṣabāb alladīna da'ū ilā at-taḡyīr wa al-iṣlāḥ awwal al-mutaḍarrarīn minhā¹³⁰

Egypt is going through difficult times, [which] it would be not right for us to allow to continue¹³¹ and the damages and losses it caused to us are growing day after day and situation (*lit.* affair) will end up with Egypt in conditions, in which the youth who called for the change and reform will become the first to suffer (*lit.* be damaged) from it.

The use of metaphors Ruler as Fatherly Figure and Power (Authority) as a Source of Wisdom helps reframe what otherwise would be interpreted as a threat into an impersonalized *warning*.

¹²⁹ On *speediness* as a definitive characteristic of al-QIṢĀṢ al-'ādil (just RETALIATION) cf. Alexander Bogomolov. An Eye for an Eye and the Struggle for Power in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring. Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia, 2015, Vol. XV, pp. 13–33.

¹³⁰ Mubarak's speech of 10 February, 2011 - <http://goo.gl/08p065>

¹³¹ This part implies a sense of *urgency* about the situation: it is so bad that the authorities just can't help doing something about it.

The manner, in which Mubarak in his speech is interpreting the protesters' *maṭālib* (demands) corresponds to a specific communicative practice representing a type of *complaint*, in Arabic described with the help of a derivative of \sqrt{zlm} – *tazallum*, which we discussed in Section 4.2 above. By framing his speech as a response to an implied *tazallum*, Mubarak rhetorically reinstates himself in the position of authority. By the time of the last speech, however, the revolutionary masses already felt empowered enough to deny Mubarak this status, which is reflected in a popular mural of the day – *anā bukra mubārak* (tomorrow I am Mubarak)¹³².

In his last speech, Mubarak pursues a strategy of engaging with the protesters discourse by manipulating meanings belonging to the semantic periphery of a set of sensitive concepts shaping the core of the revolutionary discourse: ZULM (oppression, wronging), QIṢĀṢ (retaliation), ŠAHĀDA (martyrdom), while avoiding direct nominations – he never uses the word ZULM but strives to appear as a *just ruler* (as opposed to the proverbial *sulṭān jā'ir*), the one whose justice is *speedy* just as is expected of a proper QIṢĀṢ. By following this strategy Mubarak is trying to undermine arguments, which may be harmful to his public persona, project a different reading of social reality from that of his opponents with the goal of altering their behavior. For all the polemical skill of his speech writers, Mubarak's incapacity to engage with protesters' rhetoric directly is not simply a sign of his weakness, but an evidence of the power of concepts shaping the core of the revolutionary discourse, such as ZULM.

CONCLUSIONS

The concept of ZULM demonstrates capacity to engulf within its scope of reference a broad range of human experience, including individual psychological and moral sufferings of people, who feel that they have been wronged, as well as a whole variety of social and political injustices. It has a rich evaluative component covering several subcategories of evaluation, including notably the psychological, ethical and normative ones.

¹³² According to eye witness accounts could be seen in many places around Egypt, particularly characteristic location would be the walls of a police station after a protesters' assault.

The concept was particularly enriched by its history of circulation in several types of important public discourses characterized by varying degrees of historic depth. These include: (1) the normative religious discourse, grounded in the powerful authoritative texts of the Quran and Sunna, which still form an important part of Arabic speakers' cultural thesaurus feeding into and sustained by a rich idiomatic corpus and reiterated through Muslim devotional and homiletic practices; (2) political discourses of various ideological persuasions, with two of them – the leftist and Islamist ones – putting a particular emphasis on the concept of *ZULM*; and last but not least (3) the everyday lay discussion on matters both private and social. With such a rich history of circulation and the diversity of lexico-grammatical forms of representation the concept shows an enormous sociopragmatic potential.

In the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring the concept serves as basis for formulating the rationale of the REVOLUTION (Mubarak's Egypt had been a *state of ZULM* – injustice of such scale had to be rectified by means of Revolution). Within the revolutionary discourse it also served as an interpretative model for many important events, which followed the initial 18-days sit-in in Cairo's Tahrir square and contributed to the ongoing drama of the revolution. In making sense of the revolutionary experience the concept functioned in concert with a set of other powerful concepts sharing a similar history of circulation in a range of important public discourses (religious normative, political, and lay everyday social discussion). Semantic coherence across this set of concepts (their close affinity of frame-semantic structures and shared references resulting from it) allowed them to combine and shape a neat (one might even say hermetic) narrative structure, which fleshed out a positive idealized image of the Revolution, justified its goals, glorified its heroes and condemned its enemies. A notable case in point is another concept deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition – *QIṢĀṢ* (retaliation), which forms a perfect pair to *ZULM*, with two of them sustaining a consistent narrative interpreting a vast range of episodes of the scramble for power between the revolutionaries and their enemies described as *FULŪL* (debris of the Ancien Régime).

A well-defined frame-semantic structure of the concept coupled with a clear set of various types of evaluation associated with each

semantic role – the Agent (Zālim), the Patient (Maẓlūm) and the very act of wronging or oppressing (Zulm), which may be contrasted to more abstract and hence relatively vague notions from the same semantic domain, such as ‘ADĀLA (JUSTICE), provides ZULM with a unique capacity to impose a clear-cut structure on various types of social experience by construing and representing reality from the perspective of different social actors involved. With its extensive referential scope and high salience, ZULM has developed into an essential element of the dominant ideologies and folk theories of social reality and politics, broadly characterized with a black and white vision of the society as split between two sets of social actors: the negatively evaluated powerful *wrongdoers* and positively evaluated disenfranchised victims of ZULM. As part of such discourses the concept of ZULM has contributed greatly to the persistently polarizing nature of the Arab social debate.

The imminence of ZULM as a concept of political discourse is attested by the fact that despite the rhetorical edge of ZULM-centered discourses being directed against social actors associated with POWER, the speech of both the governors and the governed accept it and find it indispensable when it comes to construing the social reality. A powerful ruler – such as Mubarak, the key referent for the word Zālim within the January 26 revolutionary discourse – feels compelled to justify his behavior by implicitly deploying the same concept or even switching roles with a common individual and portraying himself as victim of ZULM.

The sociopragmatic power of such concepts as ZULM and QIṢĀS could be accounted for by the phenomenon of interdiscursivity, whereby semantic structures characteristic of one type of discourse (which may be described as source discourse) affect those of another one enhancing the richness and persuasiveness of the recipient discourse. Such is the case of the Islamic normative discourse meanings affecting the political and regular lay discussions. The source of the unique persuasiveness of the Islamic discourses, when transplanted into the political domain, lies in the empowering effect they produce on their audiences. This empowering effect stems from the projection of a simple non-hierarchical world of the early Islam on the complexity of modern sociopolitical reality.