

**FULŪL AND REVOLUTIONARIES: NEGOTIATING
SOCIAL BOUNDARIES IN THE DISCOURSE
OF THE EGYPTIAN ARAB SPRING¹**

1. Introduction

In our two previous articles in this tripartite series we have described the origins and substantial aspects of the concept of FULŪL, a new coinage that emerged in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011 in reference to political opponents of the revolution², which still appears to be much in use to this day.

In this concluding paper of the series, we propose to address the communicative and pragmatic aspects of the concept of FULŪL, particularly its role in defining the social boundaries in the context of post-revolutionary Egypt. While social boundaries are established by vast array of social practices that may be conceived of as being material or even physical in their nature, public discussion represents a key locus where these boundaries take shape in the minds of the participants of public debate. Political media discourse, hence, represents an important instrument in the process of reshaping the social order, as it provides a space for formulating and discussing actions and counteractions of political actors and for sending verbal messages to both the supportive constituencies and the opponents. The revolution has set the whole political scene in motion and much of what has been going on so far in the public discourse, for those who describe themselves as REVOLUTIONARIES and for their opponents, who they refer to as FULŪL, could be described as negotiating new

¹ This is the third and the final article in a series on the construction of social and political *other* in the discourse of the Arab Spring in Egypt; the two previous ones include: *A. Bogomolov. Got a problem – destroy it! A frame-semantic analysis of the proverb lā yafullu al-ḥadīd illā al-ḥadīd in the Egyptian revolutionary discourse // The World of the Orient (Skhidnyi Svit), 2014, № 2, pp. 101–110 and Know your enemy: the concept of FULŪL in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution // The World of the Orient, 2014, № 3, pp. 94–106.*

² These initially included officials and clients of the Ancien Régime, subsequently, the concept was also used by the opponents of President Mursi in reference to other groups such as Muslim Brotherhood members.

boundaries between these two imaginary communities. In three sections below we shall discuss the *actions* that REVOLUTIONARIES propose to take toward FULŪL, the *messages* they address to them, and finally what FULŪL say when they *argue back*.

The texts that we analyze do not represent a direct communication (conversation) between the REVOLUTIONARIES and FULŪL, but comprise statements of various nature that circulate in a wider public domain, which makes them equally available to both one's own constituency, one's opponents and also neutral parties. Communication between the two sides is, hence, mediated through what we describe as the revolutionary media discourse, which has its genre and other substantial restrictions. Within this discourse the revolutionary authors appear to be more vocal compared to their opponents, while their texts could be described as a verbal offensive directed against their opponents, who they describe as FULŪL. Those of the other side are quite predictably defensive and reactive in their nature.

Our overall methodological approach is grounded in George Lakoff's theory of conceptual metaphor. For a finer analysis of the semantic contexts featuring the concept FULŪL, in other articles of this series we also use elements of Charles J. Fillmore's frame semantics, particularly, some frame descriptions available on the FrameNet³. Leonard Talmy's force dynamics⁴ is another theoretical framework that we found particularly useful for the analysis of modal aspects of acts that the revolutionaries ascribe to their opponents – FULŪL⁵.

2. What should *good guys* do with FULŪL?

FULŪL features frequently in the position of a direct object with the verb *aqṣā* or a genitive complement to substantivated form (maṣḍar) *iqṣā'* (to remove, displace). Cf.: *as-sīsī yuqṣī fulūl al-waṭānī al-*

³ FrameNet is a web-based corpus that contains description of the internal structure of various semantic frames that refer to various situations, actions, events such as Revolution, Hostile encounter, fight etc. – cf. <https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/home>

⁴ Cf. Leonard Talmy, Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition, Cognitive Science 12, 49–100 (1968)

⁵ See Bogomolov A. Know your enemy: the concept of FULŪL in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution // The World of the Orient, 2014, № 3, pp. 94–106.

munḥall min ḥamlatihi al-intiḥābiya (Sisi removes FULŪL of the disbanded National [Democratic Party] from his electoral campaign)⁶.

The 4th form causative Arabic verb *aqṣā* meaning in the political discourse (remove, displace) reflects an orientational metaphor, grounded in the spatial source sematic of the stem (cf. the 1st forms *qaṣā* or *qaṣiyā* – be far, be removed). A high frequency derivative of the same root – comp./superlat. adj. *aqṣā* – is used in reference to remote destinations and spatial limits, cf. *aš-šarq al-aqṣā* (the Far East), *min aqṣāhā ilā aqṣāhā* (from one extreme to the other – in ref. to a country, or the world in general). Although the original meaning of the root seems to suggest *near-far* spatial orientation, the actual application of *aqṣā* in the political discourse appears to suggest *in-out* and *central-peripheral* orientation⁷. For the *in-out* reading consider the following example: *naqīb al-muhandisīn min manūfiya: lā iqṣā’ li-ayy faṣīl wa an-niqāba maftūha li-l-jamī’* (head of engineers from Menufia: no removal/displacement for any faction and the trade union is open to all)⁸. Consider also a frequent usage in the context of sporting competitions: *arsenal aqwā al-ān wa qādir ‘alā iqṣā baršilūna* (Arsenal is stronger now and capable of displacing Barcelona)⁹. Here is a somewhat more complicated case:

naḥā ḥalaf az-zannātī naqīb al-mu’allimīn mā taraddada fī al-āwina al-aḥīra bi-anna hunāka *iqṣā’* li-ba’ḍ a’ḍā’ majlis niqābat al-mihan at-ta’līmiyya mušīran ilā anna al-jamī’ ‘alā qalb rajul wāḥid ya’malūna bi-rūḥ al-farīq al-wāḥid

Khalaf al-Zannati, [trade union] leader of teachers, denied what was repeatedly [said] as of late that there is a *displacement* of some members of the trade union council of educational professions, having pointed out that all as one man are working in the spirit of one team.

Although Council members apparently are not formally excluded from the Council, they are still alleged to be excluded from important

⁶ <http://goo.gl/bHeaW9>

⁷ The full list of orientational metaphors according to Lakoff and Johnson includes the following categories: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral, and near-far, cf. George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. *Metaphors we live by*. London: The University of Chicago press. 2003, pp. 15, 26.

⁸ A media article title: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUeVDcTIdhk>

⁹ A media article title: goo.gl/uQxKHJ

activities of this entity, which fact is denied by the trade union leader by saying that ‘all as one man are working in the spirit of one team’, i.e. they are participating in the union’s activities on an equal footing with the other members. Here activity is understood on the basis of ACTIVITY is a CONTAINER metaphor. Staying inside a container is not simply an existential fact, it enables one to engage in actions, enjoy opportunities including some form of reward, all of which are only available to those inside the CONTAINER. The removal from the CONTAINER, or displacement within it, hence also means a form of deprivation. Cf.:

min hādā al-mintaq tabannī al-liqā’ at-tašāwuri hādā at-tašawwur an yakūn li-l-kurd iqlīm dāhil sūriyā al-ittihādiya bi-mušāraka tamma min kāffat al-mukawwināt allatī ta’iṣ fi hādā al-iqlīm min dūna tahmīš aw *iqṣā’* li-aḥad aw intiqāš min ḥuqūqihi ma’a ta’kīd al-jamī’ ‘alā waḥdat sūriyā¹⁰

Under (lit. from) this logic, [is] the adoption by the consultative assembly [of] this conception that [there] be for the Kurds a province inside the federal [state of] Syria with full participation of all components (i.e. ethnic and religious communities), who live in this province, without marginalization or *displacement* of anyone or derogation to the rights [along] with the confirmation by all of the Syrian unity.

Federal Syria in this passage is metaphorically represented as a CONTAINER with another CONTAINER inside of it (*the Kurdish province*), the latter is conceived of as a space offering supposedly good opportunities to those inside it (*components*) provided they are appropriately positioned inside the container. The latter assertion comes in the form of semantic double negation: the words *tahmīš* (marginalization) *iqṣā’* (removal, displacement) and *intiqā* (derogation) all have a negative semantic component¹¹, which is negated by the prefix of exclusion *dūna* (without).

When it comes to the public offices, it is often suggested that they should be cleaned of FULŪL, cf.:

¹⁰ <http://www.elaph.com/Web/News/2014/7/919461.html>

¹¹ All could be described as ‘bad events’, whose negative semantics is expressed metaphorically based on center-periphery, in-out and more-less schemes with positive value respectively attached to the 1st part of the pair: CENTER/IN/MORE is GOOD.

wa fī al-iskandariya ṭālabat amānat ḥizb al-miṣriyīn al-aḥrār bi-*taṭhīr* hay'at al-mīnā' mimman sammathum fulūl an-nizām al-iḥwānī alladīna tamma ta'yīnuhum fī al-hay'a waqta ḥukm al-jamā'a¹²
And in Alexandria, the Secretariat of the Free Egyptians Party has demanded to *clean* the Port Administration of FULŪL of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, who were appointed to the Administration during the rule of the Brotherhood...

This is of course an instance of a universal metaphorical representation of enemies as unclean substances or creatures¹³. Graphic representations of FULŪL as pests, or even snakes, are common in the Egyptian media (cf. Images 1, 2, 3).



Image 1. Text on the bottle says *mubīd* (insecticide), over the head of the pest: *al-fulūl*

¹² <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/259076#>

¹³ ENEMY is PEST metaphor together with the notion of ‘cleansing’ or ‘extermination’ that it usually entails is a frequent occurrence in a whole family of conservative and right-wing discourses, cf. CST Protecting the Jewish Community. Antisemitic Discourse in Britain in 2012. Community Security Trust, 2013, p.12. Note also the notion of the *diseased immigrants posing a dangerous public health risk*, sharing basically the same entailment with ENEMY is PEST metaphor, which has become common to the anti-immigrant discourses, cf. Jamelle Bouie. America’s Long History of Immigrant Scaremongering – <http://goo.gl/YLNwi5>



Image 2. Campaign poster. Texts in the upper right and left corners of the picture say *imsak al-fulūl* (catch FULŪL)



Image 3. Campaign poster. Text in the upper part of the picture: *imsak al-fulūl* (catch FULŪL); in the lower part *isma', šūf, 'ul* (listen, see, say)

The entailment of the metaphor ENEMY is a PEST motivated a nation-wide political campaign under the heading *imsak fulūl* (catch FULŪL) organized by young revolutionaries with the purpose of preventing FULŪL from occupying public offices at all levels of government and administration¹⁴. Compiling lists of FULŪL of specific localities has become a common practice¹⁵. The logic behind this practice is

¹⁴ Cf. Image 3 representing one of many campaign posters.

¹⁵ A Google search for *qā'ima bi-asmā' fulūl...* (the list with the names of FULŪL [of]...) has returned 5490 references. For one of earlier lists dated 9 Nov. 2011 see an article with characteristic title *Bawwābat 25 yanā'ir tufaḍḍih asmā' fulūl al-waṭanī wa al-muwālīn lahum fī rubū' miṣr baynahum ihwānī* (the 25 January gateway debunks names of FULŪL of the National [Democratic Party] and their loyalists throughout Egypt, among them a member of Muslim Brotherhood) – <http://january-25.org/post.aspx?k=47056>

also consistent with the entailments of the ENEMIES are PESTS metaphor. Pests may become rife in a certain enclosed space¹⁶, if they are not taken care of. One way to clean the space of them could be by picking them out one by one. The orientational metaphor as discussed above in relation to the concept of IQSĀ' is fully coherent with the ENEMIES are PESTS metaphor as they share a common entailment. They both ascribe to FULŪL the tendency to occupy enclosed spaces (CONTAINERS) and justify effectively similar tactics toward FULŪL – displacing them to the periphery or removing out of the CONTAINER. The ENEMIES are PESTS metaphor enriches the purely spatial model by adding a moral evaluation component, providing thereby a stronger moral justification for the exclusion of FULŪL from the public space. With the help of its ongoing listing, the Catch Fulūl campaign was turning those who just had been in the position of authority into objects of public disgrace and symbolic elimination. For less prominent figures, finding their names on the list meant the end to the comforts of relative obscurity and exposure to an intense public scrutiny.

The concept of LIST merits a special remark. Lists are compiled by a simple procedure of adding more names. There is nothing in the conception of the LIST as such that presupposes a method of ending the process of adding, unless a narrowly defined set of criteria is adopted that may limit the scope of selection. In mathematical terms, it is a *countably infinite set*¹⁷. Although the actual lists of FULŪL as published on the web, such as the one cited in footnote 60 above, appear to have a finite number of entries at the moment we look at them, the idea that the list can be continued is obvious for any lay speaker and does not require a thorough background in mathematics. Compiling 'black lists' as a method of political pressure is in fact meant to produce this very impression that the list will continue until it captures each and everyone in the enemy ranks. Moreover, the power of an infinite set is not reduced if any number of members would be detracted from it. If anyone would succeed in eliminating

¹⁶ Here the CONTAINER metaphor is applied, which is equally good for both public offices and geographic localities.

¹⁷ Cf. the following definition: 'Any set which can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers (or integers) so that a prescription can be given for identifying its members one at a time is called a countably infinite (or denumerably infinite) set' at <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CountablyInfinite.html>

one's name from the list, the list will still potentially go on forever. Political reality of a divided nation that this logic inevitably entailed struck many by surprise in the aftermath of the first free presidential election in the history of Egypt. Here is a characteristic comment by an apparent Revolutionary, most probably a sympathizer of the Muslim Brotherhood, which collected 4,554,665 likes on the Facebook:

ba'd kull al-aṣwāt illī ḥaṣal 'alayhā aḥmad šafīq hiya maṣr kullhā fulūl?!!¹⁸

After all the votes that Ahmad Shafiq has received is all [of] Egypt FULŪL?!!¹⁹.

Here is another comment by someone from the opposite political camp:

aḥšā an tuṣbiḥa al-umma al-miṣriya ša'ban min al-fulūl fa-qad i'tabara al-iḥwān ba'd fawzihim fī ar-ri'āsa bi-naḥwa 13 milyūn ṣawt anna man manaḥū aṣwātahum li-šafīq bi-aḳtar min 12 milyūnan min al-miṣriyīn min fulūl²⁰

I am afraid that the Egyptian nation becomes a FULŪL people (lit. a people of FULŪL) as the [Muslim] Brothers after their winning of the presidency at about 13 million votes considered [those] who granted their votes to Shafiq of 12 million Egyptians as [being] FULŪL.

While INFINITY, in any form, is a concept that is psychologically hard to put up with, particularly scary should be the notion of a personified INFINITY in the form of a 'black list'. Cf. the following observation by an activist of the Catch Fulūl campaign:

al-lāfit li-n-naṣr 'alā aṣ-ṣafḥa anna fulūl al-ḥizb al-waṭanī mutābi'ūna li-ṣ-ṣafḥa fa-kulla-mā yatimmu naṣr ayy aḥbār 'anhum yaqūmūna bi-r-radd 'alayhā li-dar' al-ittihāmāt 'anhum...²¹

It is remarkable on the [web] page that FULŪL of the National [Democratic] Party are following the page and whenever any news [item] is published, [they] respond to it [in order] to fend off accusations...

¹⁸ <http://www.nmisr.com/vb/showthread.php?t=410251>

¹⁹ Ahmad Shafiq, the last prime minister of Hosni Mubarak's regime, won 12,347,380 votes in the second round of 2012 presidential election against 13,230,131 votes given to Muslim Brotherhood affiliated candidate Muhammad Mursi.

²⁰ <http://goo.gl/lnVf>

²¹ <http://goo.gl/59yZ9b>

3. Talking to FULŪL

While in our material FULŪL mostly feature either as an agent of a limited set of negative acts that could be described as *wrongdoings*, a cause of negative events, a source of public threat²², or an object of exclusion, they are still conceived of as a sentient, human entity, and, hence, potentially an interlocutor. Question merits to be posed in this regard, what, if anything, could the *good guys* tell FULŪL? Print media genres hardly allow for full-featured conversational segments. Instances of an open exchange on equal terms between parties, one of which would consider the other to be a member of FULŪL are, therefore, predictably absent from our material²³. Yet, some elements of conversational speech acts with FULŪL featuring as addressee, used primarily as a rhetorical device, could still be found. These mainly include threats, warnings, and invectives of various kinds both direct and indirect, which of course could have been part of a full-blown argument, cf.:

- a) ayyuhā al-fulūl iḥḍarū min ḡaḍbat hādā aš-ša‘b – [o] FULŪL, beware of the wrath of this people²⁴.
- b) ayyuhā al-fulūl lā tazunnū annanā nādimūna ‘alā ṭawratinā wa ḥāwalū an taḥfū šamātatakum fa-lā majāla lakum fī ḥayātinā marratan uḥrā²⁵
O (*voc. part.*) FULŪL, don't think that we are regretting over our revolution, and try to hide your malevolence for there is no space for you in our life anymore (*lit.* once more).
- c) ḥasi'tum ayyhā al-fulūl – kull ḥibratukum fī an-našb wa al-iḥtiyāl wa al-ḥarāb

²² Cf. A. Bogomolov. Know your enemy: the concept of FULŪL in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution // *The World of the Orient*, 2014, № 3, pp. 94–106.

²³ Given the said genre limitations it is not surprising that conversational elements addressed to FULŪL occur more often in comments to news articles and on social networks such as Facebook. TV texts, particularly, talk shows could perhaps open a broader perspective on the functioning of FULŪL in conversational speech acts, but for the purposes of this study, we had to limit our material to print media texts available on the web in view of the excessive size of televised dialogs.

²⁴ <http://www.vetogate.com/423764>

²⁵ <http://www.ekhbari.com/mqal1028.html>

Be off, o (*voc. part.*) FULŪL – all your experience [is] in swindling, fraud and destruction²⁶.

d) ayyuhā al-fulūl ilzamū juḥūrakum – o (*voc. part.*) FULŪL, stay in your [animal] holes²⁷.

Characteristically, many examples reflect an underlying orientational center-periphery metaphor suggesting that FULŪL should stay removed from the center, (d) combines the orientational metaphor with ENEMY is an ANIMAL as described above. These are little speech acts, whose illocutionary point is to make FULŪL retreat to the periphery of the social space. We have found only one example of non-exclusive rhetoric directed at FULŪL, which even calls FULŪL to cooperate alongside other groups for the sake of common national values, cf.:

ayyuhā al-mutaṣārī‘ūna ‘alā al-kursī, ayyuhā al-mu‘taṣimūna, ayyuhā at-tuwār, *ayyuhā al-fulūl*, ayyuhā al-‘ilmāniyīna wa al-librāliyyīna wa al-ihwān wa as-salafiyīn, ilā kull al-ḥarakāt wa al-aḥzāb wa al-i’tilāfāt, ayyuhā al-maṣriyyūna maṣr awwalan, ḥāna waqt inqāḍ ḥudūdihā ḥāna lanā an nata‘āwan ma‘a aṣ-ṣūrta wa al-jayṣ li-t-taṣaddī li-jamī‘ anwā‘ al-baḥtāja, yajib an naḥmī ḥudūd miṣr min jamī‘ al-jihāt wa kafā al-fitna baynanā²⁸

O (*voc. part.*) [those] fighting for a chair, o (*voc. part.*) [those engaged in] sit-down strike, o (*voc. part.*) revolutionaries, o (*voc. part.*) FULŪL, o (*voc. part.*) secularists, o (*voc. part.*) liberals and [Muslim] Brotherhood, and Salafis, to all movements and parties and blocks, o (*voc. part.*) Egyptians, Egypt is first and foremost. Time has come to save our borders, time for us to cooperate with the police and the army to oppose all kinds of subversion. [It is] incumbent [upon us] that we protect the border of Egypt from all sides. And enough FITNA (civic strife) between us...

The Arabic conciliatory rhetoric, when addressed to fellow-countrymen, often invokes the concept of FITNA (intraconfessional or intraethnic strife) as is the case in this paragraph, where it is cited as a

²⁶ A comment in response to a common argument used by FULŪL to prove their worth, namely, that they possess something that revolutionaries lack – a valuable technical expertise, particularly, in running the state: <http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1240819#.U9T-ueOSy6I>

²⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/ikhwangi/posts/279510655484975>

²⁸ <http://www.masrawy.com/ketabat/ArticlesDetails.aspx?AID=126741>

final argument after an emphatic and somewhat repetitive description of the common security threats.

Speakers of Islamist political persuasion often address FULŪL with standard religious formulae and quotations from the holly texts directed to *infidels* calling them effectively to (re)convert to Islam, cf.:

ḥāyifin ley min taṭbīq šar‘ allah, wa man lam yuḥkam bimā anzala allah fa-ulā’ka hum al-fāsiqūn wa az-ẓālimūn wa al-kāfirūn ittaqū allaha ayyuhā al-fulūl²⁹

Why [are you] afraid of implementing the law of Allah? And whoever was not judged by what Allah had sent down, those are the nefarious and unjust and infidel, fear Allah ye FULŪL.

Such rhetoric have probably produced some effect with some clients of the Ancien Régime indeed trying to win social acceptance by trying to look like true Muslims, only to be mocked again by the true revolutionaries, as reflected in the Image 4.



Image 4. The text says: *fulūl mutanakkir* (FULŪL in disguise)

4. FULŪL talking back

The powerful verbal offensive on FULŪL could not fail to produce a defensive or counter offensive discourse on the part of the actual and potential victims of the listing campaign. We have been able to identify two most usual discursive strategies used to undermine the

²⁹ <http://www.bladi-bladi.com/index.php/news/egypt/3058-2012-04-14-23-00-05.html>

illocutionary power of the concept: 1) an individual *defensive strategy* used to exonerate oneself by reference to *external circumstances*, without directly questioning the concept's validity, cf.:

...ḥaytu qāma al-muraššaḥ at-tābi‘ li-l-ḥizb al-munḥall sayyid ‘id bi-d-difā‘ ‘an nafsihi zā‘ iman an kāna yuwājāḥ duḡūtan min an-nizām as-sābiq fa-kāna yanzil ka-mustaqill wa lākin ‘alā mabādī’ al-ḥizb al-waṭani³⁰

...as a candidate affiliated with the dissolved Party Seyyid Id defended himself claiming that he was facing pressure from the former regime and was running as independent but on the principles of the National [Democratic] Party³¹.

and 2) a more general *offensive strategy* meant to disarm the opponent by undermining the validity of the concept as such, either by inflating its scope to make it meaningless, cf.:

wa radda ‘alā man yattahamūnahu bi-annahū fulūl bi-qawlihi: miṣr kulluhā fulūl, mušīran ilā anna jamī‘ aš-ša‘b bi-mā fihim al-iḥwān al-muslimīn kānū yata‘āmalūna ma‘a nizām mubārak³²

And [he] answered to [those] who were accusing him of [being] FULŪL buyna by: “all [of] Egypt is FULŪL”, pointing out that the entire Egyptian people including the Muslim Brotherhood were dealing with Mubarak's regime.

– or by questioning the negative evaluation embedded in the semantic structure of the concept, e.g. by representing FULŪL as worthy members of the society, cf.:

‘indamā qāmat ṭawrat 23 yūlyū lam tastab‘id kull ḥibrāt an-nizām as-sābiq bal baqat ‘alā al-‘adīd minhum li-idārat šu‘un al-bilād wa

³⁰ This is the continuation of the previously cited paragraph – *ibid*.

³¹ Here we see a typical instance of what in social psychology is described as *actor-observer bias* – a common tendency to explain one's own behavior mainly by reference to the external circumstances, while overemphasizing inherent qualities of the subject in explaining someone else's behavior (the latter tendency is also referred to as *fundamental attribution error*); FULŪL appears to be a concept structured in line with the fundamental attribution error, as FULŪL's actions or impact are seen as resulting from their inherent negative qualities. Serious examination of the psychological foundations of this and other political concepts would of course call for a more thorough research, which is outside of the scope of this study.

³² <http://goo.gl/8L4Ybt>

minhum ‘alī māhir alladī kāna ra’īsan li-l-wuzarā’ aḡtar min marra qabla at-ṭawra wa šaġala maṣṣab ad-dīwān al-malakī fī ‘ahd al-malik fu’ad wa ‘urifa bi-ḡunkatihi as-siyāsiya wa dahā’ihi fī mu‘ālat al-muhimmāt aš-sa’ba .. wa raġma dālika ‘ayyanathu at-ṭawra fī 24 yūlyū 1952 ra’īsan li-l-wuzarā’ ...³³

When the July 23 revolution occurred, [it] did not exclude all the expertise of the former regime, but kept a number of them for the administration of the affairs of the country, and among them Ali Maher who was prime-minister more than once before the revolution and occupied the post of the Royal Court during the rule of King Fuad and was known for his political prowess and sagacity in tackling the difficult issues .. and in spite of that the revolution has appointed him prime-minister on July 24, 1952...

Aside from a rich evidence base and the utility of shared background knowledge for establishing some sort of rapport with the opponent, the historic narrative also helps refocus the discussion on less emotionally charged dimensions of the situation that are often omitted in the standard revolutionary discourse³⁴. The recourse to the historic narrative here also points to an essential property of the concept, namely, the restriction on ascribing any positive qualities to FULŪL while remaining in the temporal limits of the present and recent time. Yet, not any past is safe; the mythological past of the Quran for instance could be evoked to strengthen the anti-FULŪL argument. In the example below the scenery of the Quranic ancient Egypt is projected on the political reality of Mubarak’s regime to undermine the above cited ‘counterrevolutionary’ thesis that ‘everyone is FULŪL in Egypt’, cf.:

³³ <http://goo.gl/pxNw5r>

³⁴ Here we use the term *dimensions* in Lakoff & Johnson sense (cf. George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. *Metaphors we live by*. London: The University of Chicago press. 2003): i.e. various aspects of experiential gestalt such as *participants, purpose, process, stages* etc. Historic narrative has the capacity of shifting the focus to process dynamics, purposefulness and other abstract dimensions while downplaying the evaluative and emotional components that characterize the polemical discourse as represented in most of the material reviewed so far. The use of historic narrative in political argument certainly merits a more serious discussion, which again would go beyond the scope of the present study.

mu‘arīḏū aṭ-ṭawra yaqūlūna inna miṣra kulluhā fulūl wa inna miṣra mubārak allafī kānat tuḥkam bi-l-ḥadīd wa an-nār kull man kānū ya‘īṣūna ‘alā arḏihā kānū mujarrad junūd fī jays hāmān³⁵
 [Those] opposed to the revolution say that all of Egypt [is] FULŪL and that Mubarak’s Egypt, which was ruled by iron and fire, all who lived on its soil were merely soldiers in Haman’s army.

The logic of open-ended listing on the basis of loose criteria has ultimately backfired on the revolutionaries themselves. The strongest argument of anti-Mursi protests in spring – summer of 2013, which culminated in a military coup that brought down the first Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president, was his alleged desire to Brotherhoodize the country (*aḥwanat al-balad*), by which not so much the imposition of strict Sharia norms was meant but the creeping replacement at every level of public administration of old cadre with members and loyalists of the Muslim Brotherhood. In adopting this policy, President Mursi followed not so much the Sharia as the logic embedded in the concept of FULŪL. When military came back to power on June 30, 2013 they launched an arrest and summary death sentencing campaign against Muslim Brotherhood that followed basically the same logic, although this time no public campaign for identifying political opponents was needed to round up Brotherhood members and participants of Brotherhood-led anti-coup rallies as their lists were already available to the security service and the police. Continuity of essentially the same logic vis-à-vis Muslim Brotherhood by their opponents is reflected in the use of the same concept FULŪL in reference to Muslim Brotherhood loyalists in the context of anti-Mursi protests and the coup of June 30, 2013, cf.:

fī al-iskandariya ṭalabat amānat ḥizb al-miṣriyīn al-aḥrār bi-taḥṭīr hay‘at al-mīnā’ mimman sammathum *fulūl an-niṣām al-iḥwānī* allaḏīna tamma ta‘yīnuhum fī al-hay‘a waqta ḥukm al-jamā‘a...³⁶

In Alexandria, the Secretariat of the Free Egyptians Party has demanded to clear the Administration of the Port of the FULŪL of the Brotherhood regime who had been appointed to the Administration during the rule of the Society [of the Muslim Brothers]...

³⁵ <http://www.masress.com/almessa/29168> Haman is the Quranic pharaoh’s henchman, who rejected the prophet Musa (Moses) call to monotheism, Haman and Pharaoh and ‘their army’ are mentioned in Quran 29:6,8.

³⁶ Publication date 4 Sept 2013 – i.e. two months after the toppling of president Mursi <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/259076#>

Was it inevitable, the way the Egyptian revolutionaries have conceptualized their opponents as *FULŪL*, that their effort to change the country after decades of authoritarian rule should lead to indiscriminate political practices of exclusion, symbolic and ultimately physical, as in the case with the Muslim Brotherhood members, elimination of the political opponents? From a more general perspective of cognitive semantics there certainly could be other, less polarizing, models of conceptualizing the political or social *other* that would allow for a more balanced view of the political scene and help achieve a broader social consensus. European languages, for instance, have a vast list of counter concepts allowing victims of blacklisting campaigns to mount a powerful resistance. In the English language these include such concepts as *witch hunt*, *smear campaign*, *scaremongering*, which portray broad scale blacklisting practices as politically incorrect, immoral or even illegal. Such counter concepts, however, would never become part of a common political vocabulary without a long experience of tense political competition and civil conflicts that the European nations had to go through. Black lists, as common as they are in the situations of civil conflict, can be also less indiscriminate if they factor in more narrowly defined selection criteria. During the Orange revolution of 2004, and the pro-European anti-government rallies of 2013 in Ukraine, the practice of blacklisting also was quite common. But while it served a similar purpose of demoralizing the political opponents, the blacklisting targeted only a relatively narrow group of officials involved in election fraud and judges, who issued what was seen as unjust verdicts against political activists, while the blacklisting of a particular individual was based on ostensibly well-documented evidence of his or her engagement in such acts. Catch *FULŪL* campaign lists, by way of contrast, only comprised names of individuals without reference to any incriminating evidence against them. Conceptual systems are linked to the way we experience and understand reality³⁷.

³⁷ Cf. "...truth is relative to understanding, which means that there is no absolute standpoint from which to obtain absolute objective truths about the world. This does not mean that there are no truths; it means only that *truth is relative to our conceptual system, which is grounded in, and constantly tested by, our experiences and those of other members of our culture in our daily interactions with other people and with our physical and cultural environments*" (emphasis added. – A. B. – George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. *Metaphors we live by*. London: The University of Chicago press. 2003, p. 193).

Political concepts are both the reflection and the means of reproduction of social realities that we live in. For the Egyptian society that emerged from decades of highly repressive political regimes, January 25 revolution offered its first experience of a large scale open political debate and competition for power that had pitted against each other multiple political actors, whose channels of communication had so far been very limited. It is not surprising, therefore, that a polarizing discourse with FULŪL as its key concept would emerge in a polarized society that had never had enough chance even to discuss their differences.

5. Conclusions³⁸

FULŪL is yet another term, among the many that the human languages continue to generate on a regular basis, for *othering* the opponents, rivals, etc. Such concepts are used to establish and reinforce social boundaries, mark out social spaces and create no-go zones, which the adversary should not be allowed to enter. In the case of FULŪL, the latter include not just any social spaces, but institutions of authority being it a public office, trade union, corporate management, university or media outlet. By following the concept wherever it leads, one can in fact map out all institutions that the Egyptian political culture perceives as seats of power and prestige. The REVOLUTIONARIES strived to *clean* all such places (conceptualized on the basis of standard ontological metaphor of CONTAINER) of all who they see as their *defeated enemies*, the *remnants* of the Ancien Régime.

The toppling of a long-surviving authoritarian regime that inherited power from two other no less authoritarian ones had been a very novel experience for the entire Egyptian society. The new political reality that the Egyptians had faced called into being a set of brand new concepts that never before had been part of standard political vocabulary. It is notable that among these new concepts was the one that expressed the archetypical idea of political ADVERSARY or ENEMY familiar to all cultures. Unlike the latter generic concepts, however, FULŪL evolved in a specific political, cultural and socio-psychological context of the 2011 Egyptian crisis and reflected the moral and

³⁸ These are the general observations that relate to the entire tripartite series – for reference to the other two articles see footnote 1.

emotional atmosphere of the stand-off at the Egyptian capital's main square Maidan at-Tahrir and the ensuing heated political debate. As such, FULŪL was grounded in the beliefs that motivated the revolutionaries, in their intentions and aspirations that gave them a sense of purpose and direction in their subsequent actions. It has, therefore, become a vehicle of social and political change and an instrument of power struggle. While the post-revolutionary political process in Egypt went through its three dramatic cycles with power changing hands between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and again the military, who initially had been supported by liberal intellectuals, young leftists and bearded Salafi traditionalists, with every one of them claiming an exclusive right to the legacy of the REVOLUTION, the concept gradually evolved into an almost universal instrument of exclusion, now applicable even to those, who initially appeared to be the winners and the very prototype of the REVOLUTIONARIES. The concept has thus contributed to the construction of what could be described as a *polarizing discourse of exclusion* shaping political and social practices that ultimately divided the Egyptian society even deeper and brought about the reversal of the early accomplishments of the January 25 revolution.

Political discourse concept is not an analytical category. It hardly can be expected to help those who use it reach a greater level of understanding of the political reality or to operate on it in a rational way, even if projects a different vision of it. What a popular concept like FULŪL that spreads all over the nation and becomes one of the universally accepted names of the game in months if not days effectively does, is that it captures the most common understandings regarding the shared social reality that people were able to achieve at a specific point of time. As a material for study concepts may be compared to an opinion poll, but is richer in scope as it links beliefs with current reflections and motivations for actions, the present with the expected future. While studying concepts we may better understand why people do what they do and why they don't do what others expect them to do. In this article, along with two others in this series, we seem to have found a partial answer to the difficult questions, why the Egyptian revolution was not nearly as democratic as it was portrayed by the Western media, and why it ultimately failed to change the Egyptian society even though it has succeeded in toppling an authoritarian regime.